

# BLAC: Revoking Repeatedly Misbehaving Anonymous Users Without Relying on TTPs

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Several credential systems have been proposed in which users can authenticate to service providers anonymously. Since anonymity can give users the license to misbehave, some variants allow the selective deanonymization (or linking) of misbehaving users upon a complaint to a trusted third party (TTP). The ability of the TTP to revoke a user's privacy at any time, however, is too strong a punishment for misbehavior. To limit the scope of deanonymization, some systems have been proposed in which users can be deanonymized only if they authenticate "too many times," such as "double spending" with electronic cash. While useful in some applications, such techniques cannot be generalized to more subjective definitions of misbehavior, e.g., using such schemes it is not possible to block anonymous users who "deface too many webpages" on a website.

We present BLAC, the first anonymous credential system in which service providers can revoke the credentials of misbehaving users without relying on a TTP. Since revoked users remain anonymous, misbehaviors can be judged subjectively without users fearing arbitrary deanonymization by a TTP. Additionally, our construction supports a *d-strikes-out* revocation policy, whereby users who have been subjectively judged to have repeatedly misbehaved at least  $d$  times are revoked from the system. Thus, for the first time, it is indeed possible to block anonymous users who have "defaced too many webpages" using our scheme.

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## 1. INTRODUCTION

While anonymous access to *service providers (SPs)* offers users a high degree of privacy, it can give users the license to misbehave without the fear of punishment. For example, Wikipedia<sup>1</sup> has allowed editors to modify content anonymously, and as a result several users have misbehaved by posting inappropriate content. SPs, therefore, desire some level of accountability against misbehaving users. Several anonymous credential systems have been proposed in which users can be selectively deanonymized or have their accesses linked (pseudonymized) under special circumstances. As we will discuss, for certain applications the existing schemes are either

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<sup>1</sup><http://www.wikipedia.org>

too punitive—deanonymization (or linking) is unreasonably harsh, and often relies on *trusted third parties (TTPs)* capable of revoking a user’s privacy at any time—or too restrictive—allowing deanonymization under only certain narrowly defined types of misbehavior.

Deanonymizing a user is not always necessary; in some cases it is sufficient to simply block misbehaving users from making future accesses (while maintaining their anonymity). We call this property *privacy-enhanced revocation*,<sup>2</sup> where revoked users remain anonymous. For example, anonymous access at SPs such as Wikipedia and YouTube<sup>3</sup> empowers users to disseminate content without the fear of persecution—a user may add political content on Wikipedia that is forbidden by his or her government, or post a video of police brutality to YouTube. While SPs may want to penalize other users who deface webpages or post copyrighted material, it is of paramount importance for SPs to preserve the anonymity of their well-behaving users. Privacy-enhanced revocation guarantees anonymity to *all* users, and SPs can penalize misbehavior without the risk of exposing legitimate users.

Anonymous credential systems that support accountability [Chaum and van Heyst 1991; Ateniese et al. 2000; Camenisch and Lysyanskaya 2001; Boneh et al. 2004; Camenisch and Lysyanskaya 2004; Kiayias and Yung 2005] feature a TTP called the *Open Authority (OA)*. The OA is capable of deanonymizing (or linking) the user behind any anonymous authentication. Anonymous credential systems with dynamic membership revocation [Ateniese et al. 2002; Camenisch and Lysyanskaya 2002a; Boneh and Shacham 2004; Nguyen 2005], many of which are constructed from dynamic accumulators [Camenisch and Lysyanskaya 2002a], also feature a TTP that is capable of deanonymizing (or linking) users. Recently, some of the authors of this paper proposed the Nymble system [Johnson et al. 2007], which makes several practical considerations for anonymous IP-address blocking in anonymizing networks such as Tor [Dingledine et al. 2004], but it too relies on a TTP (albeit distributed). The existence of such TTPs, however, is undesirable—users can never be assured their privacy will be maintained by the TTP. Defining the circumstances under which a TTP can expose a user, and ensuring its trustworthiness to judge fairly, is an undue burden on the system. For such applications, therefore, *a system without TTPs is desirable*.

To eliminate the reliance on TTPs, certain “threshold-based” approaches such as e-cash [Au et al. 2005; Camenisch et al. 2005; 2006] and *k-Times Anonymous Authentication (k-TAA)* [Teranishi et al. 2004; Nguyen and Safavi-Naini 2005; Au et al. 2006; Teranishi and Sako 2006] have been proposed. In these schemes, users are guaranteed anonymity unless they authenticate more than a certain number of threshold times. For example, spending an e-coin twice (“double spending,” an undesirable action) or authenticating  $k + 1$  times in a *k-TAA* scheme provides the SP with enough information to compute the user’s identity. Linkable ring signatures [Liu et al. 2004; Tsang et al. 2004] and periodic *n*-times anonymous authentication [Camenisch et al. 2006] also fall into this category. Unfortunately, misbehavior cannot always be defined in terms of threshold values such as double

<sup>2</sup>We originally called this concept *anonymous blacklisting* [Tsang et al. 2007a]. As will become clear, we differentiate between the action of blacklisting, which may or may not result in revocation.

<sup>3</sup><http://www.youtube.com>

spending. For example, “inappropriate” edits to a Wikipedia page, or “offensive” video uploads to YouTube are usually identified based on human subjectivity and cannot be reduced to “too many authentications.” For such applications, therefore, *subjective judging is desirable*.

Finally, we note that Syverson et al. [1997] present a relevant scheme in which SPs issue users blind tokens that are renewed at the end of a user’s transaction for a subsequent authentication. An SP can block future connections from a user by simply not issuing a new token at the end of a transaction (e.g., if the user fails to pay for continued service). The drawback of this approach is that misbehavior must be judged while the user is online. Such a scheme, therefore, is not practical in our setting, where a user’s misbehavior is usually identified long after he or she has disconnected. Thus, *a system where users’ accesses can be revoked after they have disconnected is desirable*.

### 1.1 Our Contributions

We present the *Blacklistable Anonymous Credential system* (BLAC), which was the first<sup>4</sup> construction of an anonymous credential system that supports privacy-enhanced revocation and subjective judging without relying on TTPs that are capable of revoking the privacy of users at will. We formalize the security model for such a system and prove that our construction is secure under this model. Furthermore, we implement our construction and evaluate its performance analytically and experimentally. These results were reported in a conference paper [Tsang et al. 2007a] and a technical report [Tsang et al. 2007b], which included more details.

In this article we make a significant additional contribution by extending our original construction of BLAC to provide more flexible revocation—SPs can specify a *d*-strikes-out revocation policy, so that users can authenticate anonymously only if they have not misbehaved *d* or more times. Such a policy forgives a few (i.e., up to  $d - 1$ ) misbehaviors, but then blocks users who misbehave repeatedly. Following authentication, users remain anonymous, and SPs learn only whether a user has crossed the threshold of *d* misbehaviors. The original construction of BLAC is a special case with  $d = 1$ .

Our proposed concept of *d*-strikes-out is an important improvement on existing threshold schemes such as *k*-TAA, which deanonymize (or link) users who *authenticate* more than a certain number of times. *k*-TAA cannot be used to punish “too many *misbehaviors*” (unless “too many authentications” itself is deemed to be a misbehavior) because users necessarily suffer degraded privacy after *k* *authentications*. Our scheme, for the first time, decouples the notion of misbehaviors from authentications—users can verify the SP’s blacklist of identified misbehaviors and be assured that their authentication will be anonymous, irrespective of the number of past authentications.

Finally, formally defining the exact meaning of security (and privacy) of BLAC that supports a *d*-strikes-out revocation policy is a non-trivial task. We have spent

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<sup>4</sup>Concurrently and independently, Brickell and Li [2007] proposed a similar scheme called *Enhanced Privacy ID (EPID)*; more recently, the authors of this paper (BLAC) presented *Privacy-Enhanced Revocation with Efficient Authentication (PEREA)* [Tsang et al. 2008], which alters the semantics of revocation for more efficient authentication. We discuss them in Section 9.

considerable effort in formalizing a security model and proving the security of our construction under this model.

## 1.2 Paper Outline

We provide a high-level overview of BLAC in Section 2. In Section 3 we present preliminary information on the various cryptographic tools and assumptions used in our construction. In Section 4, we formalize the syntax and security properties for BLAC. We present our construction at a high level in Section 5, and fill in the details of how the various zero-knowledge proofs can be instantiated in Section 6. We analyze the algorithmic complexity and security of our construction in Section 7, and present an experimental evaluation of it in Section 8. We discuss several issues in Section 9, and finally conclude in Section 10.

## 2. SOLUTION OVERVIEW

We give a high-level overview of our *Blacklistable Anonymous Credential system* (BLAC) in this section, and defer the details of its construction to the subsequent sections.

In our system, *users* authenticate to *Service Providers (SPs)* anonymously using *credentials* issued by a *Group Manager (GM)*. The GM is responsible for *enrolling* legitimate users into the system by issuing credentials to them.<sup>5</sup> Each enrolled user privately owns a unique credential, which is not known even by the GM. We emphasize that the GM is *not* a TTP that can compromise the privacy of users, i.e., the GM cannot link a specific user to an authentication. The GM is trusted only to enroll legitimate users into the system, and to issue at most one credential per user. The GM may demand or check various user attributes to enroll the user in the system, but once enrollment is complete the authentications are anonymous even to the GM. SPs are willing to serve enrolled anonymous users that have never misbehaved thus far, where misbehavior may be arbitrarily defined and subjectively judged by each individual SP. We describe this process next.

The novelty of our approach is that SPs maintain their own *blacklists* of misbehaving users without knowing the identity of the misbehaving users. Users anonymously authenticating to the SP must first prove that there are fewer than  $d$  entries on the blacklist corresponding to that user (otherwise authentication will fail). Following a user's authentication, SPs store a *ticket* extracted from the *protocol transcript* of the authentication and if the user is later deemed to have misbehaved during the *authenticated session*, possibly long after the user has disconnected, the SP can add the ticket as an entry into its blacklist.<sup>6</sup> If a user Alice detects that she is on the blacklist ( $d$  or more times), she terminates the authentication and disconnects immediately. The SP, therefore, learns only that some anonymous revoked user was refused a connection, and does not learn the identity of the revoked user. Users that are not revoked will be able to authenticate successfully, and the SPs learn only that the user is not on the blacklist  $d$  or more times. Furthermore, our

<sup>5</sup>Who is a legitimate user and how to verify such legitimacy are application-dependent.

<sup>6</sup>In practice, the SP may privately log arbitrary information about an authenticated session that is necessary for it to judge at a later time whether the anonymous user misbehaved during that session.

system allows SPs to *remove* entries from the blacklist, thereby forgiving past misbehaviors. Depending on the severity of misbehavior, a user may be blacklisted for varying periods of time — using inappropriate language could correspond to being blacklisted for one week, whereas posting copyrighted material could correspond to one month. Users are always assured that if they successfully authenticate to an SP their access will always remain anonymous — all that an SP can do is block *future* accesses by a misbehaving user.

*A Glimpse into Tickets.* Tickets are a vital object in BLAC. A ticket is the only piece in the authentication protocol transcript that contains information about the identity of the authenticating user. Jumping ahead, tickets in BLAC have the form of  $(s, t)$ , where the serial number  $s$  is a bit-string and the tag  $t$  is an element in a DDH-hard group  $\mathbb{G}$  (to be defined later). A user produces a new ticket during each authentication by randomly choosing  $s$  and computing  $t$  as  $H(s||\text{sid})^x$ , where  $\text{sid}$  is the target server’s identity,  $x$  is from the user’s credential and  $H$  is a secure cryptographic hash function.

Here we highlight three features of such a ticket construction. First, it allows every user to produce tickets that are different and more importantly unlinkable, for otherwise SPs would be able to tell if two authentications are from the same user. Second, users can prove and disprove to the SPs that a ticket belongs to them. This allows, on the one hand, for users to prove that they are not blacklisted, and, on the other hand, the prevention of users fabricating incorrect tickets to circumvent blacklisting and/or impersonating and hence framing other users. Finally, it provides the option to allow or disallow the sharing of blacklist entries (tickets) between SPs. Sharing a blacklist entry would allow multiple SPs to block a user who misbehaved at one of the SPs. We will first present the system where such sharing is *disallowed* and then point out how to allow sharing in Section 9.

### 3. PRELIMINARIES

In this section we outline the assumptions and cryptographic tools that we use as building blocks in our BLAC construction.

#### 3.1 Notation and terminology

$|S|$  represents the cardinality of a set  $S$ . If  $S$  is a non-empty set,  $a \in_R S$  means that  $a$  is an element in  $S$  drawn uniformly at random from  $S$ .  $A \subseteq_d S$  denotes that  $A$  is a subset of  $S$  of cardinality  $d$ . We denote by  $\mathbb{N}$  the set of natural numbers  $\{1, 2, \dots\}$  and by  $\mathbb{Z}^*$  the set of non-negative integers  $\{0, 1, 2, \dots\}$ . If  $n \in \mathbb{Z}^*$ , we write  $[n]$  to mean the set  $\{1, 2, \dots, n\}$ ;  $[0]$  is the empty set  $\emptyset$ . If  $s, t \in \{0, 1\}^*$ , then  $s||t \in \{0, 1\}^*$  is the concatenation of binary strings  $s$  and  $t$ .

A sequence  $Q = (a_1, a_2, \dots, a_\ell)$  is an ordered list of  $\ell \in \mathbb{Z}^*$  (not necessarily unique) natural numbers  $a_1, a_2, \dots, a_\ell$ .  $Q$  is *index-bounded-from-below*, or simply *bounded*, if  $a_i \geq i$  for all  $i \in [\ell]$ .  $Q$  is empty if  $\ell = 0$ ; an empty sequence is by definition always *bounded*. For any  $k \in \mathbb{N}$ ,  $Q$  can be partitioned into  $k$  (possibly empty) subsequences  $Q_1, Q_2, \dots, Q_k$  in an order-preserving manner. We call the set  $P = \{Q_1, Q_2, \dots, Q_k\}$  a *k-partitioning* of  $Q$ . There is at least one *k-partitioning* of  $Q$  for all  $k \in \mathbb{N}$ . Finally, a sequence  $Q$  is *k-boundedly-partitionable*, or simply *k-partitionable*, if there exists a *bounded k-partitioning* of  $Q$ .

We note the following two facts. (1) If  $Q$  is  $k$ -partitionable, then  $Q$  is also  $k'$ -partitionable, for all  $k' > k$ . Thus, if  $Q$  is not  $k$ -partitionable, then  $Q$  is also not  $k'$ -partitionable for all  $k' \in [k-1]$ . (2) If  $Q$  is  $k$ -partitionable, then any subsequence  $Q'$  of  $Q$  is also  $k$ -partitionable. Thus, if  $Q$  is not  $k$ -partitionable, then any sequence  $Q'$  that contains  $Q$  as a subsequence is also not  $k$ -partitionable.

### 3.2 Pairings

A *pairing* is a bilinear mapping from a pair of group elements to a group element. Specifically, let  $\mathbb{G}_1$ ,  $\mathbb{G}_2$  and  $\mathbb{G}$  be multiplicative cyclic groups of order  $p$ . Suppose  $P$  and  $Q$  are generators of  $\mathbb{G}_1$  and  $\mathbb{G}_2$  respectively. A function  $\hat{e} : \mathbb{G}_1 \times \mathbb{G}_2 \rightarrow \mathbb{G}$  is said to be a pairing if it satisfies the following properties:

- (Bilinearity.)  $\hat{e}(A^x, B^y) = \hat{e}(A, B)^{xy}$  for all  $A \in \mathbb{G}_1$ ,  $B \in \mathbb{G}_2$  and  $x, y \in \mathbb{Z}_p$ .
- (Non-degeneracy.)  $\hat{e}(P, Q) \neq 1$ , where 1 is the identity element in  $\mathbb{G}$ .
- (Efficient Computability.)  $\hat{e}(A, B)$  can be computed efficiently (i.e., in polynomial time) for all  $A \in \mathbb{G}_1$  and  $B \in \mathbb{G}_2$ .

### 3.3 Mathematical Assumptions

The security of our BLAC construction requires the following two assumptions:

**ASSUMPTION 1 DDH.** The *Decisional Diffie-Hellman (DDH)* problem in group  $\mathbb{G}$  is defined as follows: On input of a quadruple  $(g, g^a, g^b, g^c) \in \mathbb{G}^4$ , output 1 if  $c = ab$  and 0 otherwise. We say that the DDH assumption holds in group  $\mathbb{G}$  if no probabilistic polynomial time (PPT) algorithm has non-negligible advantage over random guessing in solving the DDH problem in  $\mathbb{G}$ .

**ASSUMPTION 2  $q$ -SDH.** The  *$q$ -Strong Diffie-Hellman ( $q$ -SDH)* problem in  $(\mathbb{G}_1, \mathbb{G}_2)$  is defined as follows: On input of a  $(q+2)$ -tuple  $(g_0, h_0, h_0^x, h_0^{x^2}, \dots, h_0^{x^q}) \in \mathbb{G}_1 \times \mathbb{G}_2^{q+1}$ , output a pair  $(A, c) \in \mathbb{G}_1 \times \mathbb{Z}_p$  such that  $A^{(x+c)} = g_0$  where  $|\mathbb{G}_1| = p$ . We say that the  $q$ -SDH assumption holds in  $(\mathbb{G}_1, \mathbb{G}_2)$  if no PPT algorithm has non-negligible advantage in solving the  $q$ -SDH problem in  $(\mathbb{G}_1, \mathbb{G}_2)$ .

The  $q$ -SDH assumption was introduced by Boneh and Boyen [2004] and has since then been used in many cryptographic schemes [Boneh et al. 2004; Kiayias and Yung 2005; Boyen 2007; Catalano et al. 2008]. Boneh and Boyen [2004] derived a lower bound on any generic algorithms that solve the  $q$ -SDH problem.

### 3.4 Proofs of Knowledge

In a *Zero-Knowledge Proof of Knowledge (ZKPoK)* protocol [Goldwasser et al. 1989], a prover convinces a verifier that some statement is true without the verifier learning anything except the validity of the statement.  $\Sigma$ -protocols are a type of ZKPoK protocols, which can be converted into non-interactive *Signature Proof of Knowledge (SPK)* schemes, or simply signature schemes [Goldwasser et al. 1988], that are secure under the *Random Oracle (RO)* Model [Bellare and Rogaway 1993].

In the following, we review several  $\Sigma$ -protocols that will be needed as building blocks in our construction. We follow the notation introduced by Camenisch and Stadler [1997]. For instance,  $PK\{(x) : y = g^x\}$  denotes a  $\Sigma$ -protocol that proves the knowledge of  $x \in \mathbb{Z}_p$  such that  $y = g^x$  for some  $y \in \mathbb{G}$ . The corresponding

signature scheme resulting from the application of the Fiat-Shamir heuristic to the above  $\Sigma$ -protocol is denoted by  $SPK\{(x) : y = g^x\}(M)$ .

**3.4.1 Knowledge and Inequalities of Discrete Logarithms (DLs).** Let  $g, b \in \mathbb{G}$  and  $b_i \in \mathbb{G}$  for all  $i$  be generators of some group  $\mathbb{G}$  of prime order  $p$  such that their relative DLs are unknown. One can prove in zero-knowledge the knowledge of the DL  $x \in \mathbb{Z}_p$  of  $y \in \mathbb{G}$  in base  $g$  by using the  $\Sigma$ -protocol  $PK\{(x) : y = g^x\}$ , the construction of which first appeared in Schnorr identification [Schnorr 1991]. As we shall see, our BLAC construction requires the SPK of this protocol to prove the correctness of tickets.

One can further prove in zero-knowledge that  $x$  does *not* equal  $\log_b t$ , the DL of  $t \in \mathbb{G}$  in base  $b$ , using the  $\Sigma$ -protocol  $PK\{(x) : y = g^x \wedge t \neq b^x\}$ , the most efficient construction of which is due to Camenisch and Shoup [2003, §5].

In our BLAC construction we will need a generalized version of the above  $\Sigma$ -protocol to prove that a user is not currently on the blacklist. In particular, we need a protocol that allows one to prove in zero-knowledge that, for some  $n > 1$  and for all  $i = 1$  to  $n$ ,  $x \neq \log_{b_i} t_i$ , where  $t_i \in \mathbb{G}$ . That is,

$$PK \left\{ (x) : y = g^x \wedge \left( \bigwedge_{i=1}^n t_i \neq b_i^x \right) \right\}.$$

Such a  $\Sigma$ -protocol can be constructed by applying a technique due to Cramer et al. [1994] to Camenisch and Shoup's construction mentioned above.<sup>7</sup>

**3.4.2 Proving  $d$  out of  $n$  DL representations.** Let  $n, d$  be positive integers such that  $d \leq n$ . Let  $\tilde{A}_i, b_i, t_i$  be elements in some group  $\mathbb{G}$  of prime order  $p$  such that there exist  $\mathcal{I} \subseteq_d [n]$  and  $\beta, \rho \in \mathbb{Z}_p$  such that  $\tilde{A}_i = b_i^\beta t_i^{-\rho}$  for all  $i \in \mathcal{I}$ . One can prove in zero-knowledge the knowledge of such  $(\beta, \rho)$  by using the  $\Sigma$ -protocol:

$$PK \left\{ (\beta, \rho) : \bigvee_{\mathcal{I} \subseteq_d [n]} \bigwedge_{i \in \mathcal{I}} \tilde{A}_i = b_i^\beta t_i^{-\rho} \right\},$$

the construction of which was first presented by Cramer et al. [1994] with  $O(n)$  complexity both during signing and verification.

**3.4.3 BBS+ Signatures.** Let  $g_0, g_1, g_2 \in \mathbb{G}_1$  and  $h_0 \in \mathbb{G}_2$  be generators of  $\mathbb{G}_1$  and  $\mathbb{G}_2$  respectively such that  $g_0 = \psi(h_0)$  and their relative DLs are unknown, where  $\psi$  is a computable isomorphism and  $(\mathbb{G}_1, \mathbb{G}_2)$  is a pair of groups of prime order  $p$  in which the  $q$ -SDH assumption holds. Let  $\hat{e}$  be a pairing defined over the pair of groups. One can prove the possession of a tuple  $(A, e, x, y) \in \mathbb{G}_1 \times \mathbb{Z}_p^3$  such that  $A^{e+\gamma} = g_0 g_1^x g_2^y$ , or equivalently,  $\hat{e}(A, wh_0^e) = \hat{e}(g_0 g_1^x g_2^y, h_0)$ , where  $w = h_0^\gamma$ , by the following  $\Sigma$ -protocol:

$$PK \{(A, e, x, y) : A^{e+\gamma} = g_0 g_1^x g_2^y\}.$$

Boneh et al. [2004, §4] presented a construction of this protocol, which is secure under the Decision-linear Diffie-Hellman assumption. Au et al. [2006] provided

<sup>7</sup>The technique describes a general method of constructing proofs of disjunction or conjunction of any of the two statements about knowledge of discrete logarithms.

a modified construction that is perfect zero-knowledge, and hence does not rely on any hardness assumption. As first pointed out by Camenisch and Lysyanskaya [2004], the protocol’s corresponding SPK is actually the SDH-variant of *CL Signatures* [Camenisch and Lysyanskaya 2002b], which Au et al. [2006] refer to as *BBS+ Signatures*.

Our BLAC construction will make use of BBS+ Signatures as a building block for users to prove that they are enrolled in the system.

## 4. MODEL

We present the syntax of BLAC, followed by the security properties that any BLAC construction must satisfy.

### 4.1 Syntax

The entities in BLAC are the *Group Manager (GM)*, a set of *Service Providers (SPs)* and a set of *users*. BLAC consists of the following protocols:

#### 4.1.1 Setup: $(gpk, gsk) \leftarrow Setup(1^\lambda)$ .

The *Setup* algorithm is executed by the GM to set up the system. On input of security parameter  $1^\lambda$ , the algorithm outputs a pair consisting of a group public key **gpk** and a group private key **gsk**. The GM keeps **gsk** private and publishes **gpk** to the public.  $1^\lambda$  and **gpk** are implicit input to all the algorithms described below.

#### 4.1.2 Registration: $(Registration^{GM}() \leftrightarrow Registration^U())$ .

The *Registration* protocol is executed between the GM (running the PPT algorithm  $Registration^{GM}(\mathbf{gsk})$ ) and a legitimate user (running the PPT algorithm  $\mathbf{cred} \leftarrow Registration^U()$ ) to register the user into the system. Upon successful completion of the protocol, the user obtains a credential **cred**, which she keeps private, and is thereby enrolled as a member in the group of registered users.

#### 4.1.3 Authentication: $(Authentication^U() \leftrightarrow Authentication^{SP}())$ .

The *Authentication* protocol is executed between a user (running the PPT algorithm  $Authentication^U(\mathbf{cred})$ ) and an SP (running the PPT algorithm  $\{\mathbf{success}, \mathbf{failure}\} \leftarrow Authentication^{SP}(\mathbf{BL}, d)$ ). The initial input to the user is her credential **cred**. The initial input to the SP is its blacklist (**BL**) and a threshold value  $d$ . When an execution of the protocol terminates, the SP outputs a binary value of **success** or **failure**. If the SP outputs **success** in an execution of the protocol, we call the execution a successful authentication and say that the authenticating user has succeeded in authenticating herself; otherwise the authentication is unsuccessful and the user has failed. Only upon a successful authentication does the SP establish an authenticated session with the authenticating user during which the user can access the service provided by the SP. Note that the *protocol transcript*,  $\varpi$ , of a successful authentication as seen by the SP is useful for the SP to blacklist the authenticating user, as described next.

#### 4.1.4 Blacklist Management.

This is a suite of three algorithms:  $\mathbf{ticket} \leftarrow Extract(\varpi)$ ,  $\mathbf{BL} \leftarrow Add(\mathbf{BL}', \mathbf{ticket})$ , and  $\mathbf{BL}' \leftarrow Remove(\mathbf{BL}, \mathbf{ticket})$ , which are executed by SPs for managing their blacklists. On input of an authentication protocol transcript  $\varpi$ , *Extract* extracts



and returns a ticket from the transcript. A *blacklist* BL is a collection of tickets. On input of a blacklist and a ticket, *Add* returns a new blacklist that contains all the tickets in the input blacklist as well as the input ticket. On the other hand, on input of a blacklist and a ticket, *Remove* returns a new blacklist that contains all the tickets in the input blacklist, except the one(s) equivalent to the input ticket.<sup>8</sup>

When we say that a user Alice is *blacklisted* by an SP, we mean that there exists an authentication between Alice and the SP such that the SP has added the ticket extracted from the authentication transcript to its blacklist and has not removed it (yet). Otherwise Alice is *not blacklisted* by the SP. Also, we say that Alice is *misbehaving*, and thus *revoked*, with respect to the SP if she has been blacklisted by the SP at least a threshold number of times  $d$ . Otherwise, she is *well-behaving*.

## 4.2 Correctness and Security

Any BLAC construction must be correct and secure:

**DEFINITION 1 CORRECTNESS.** A construction of the BLAC system is correct if all entities in the system being honest (i.e., they follow the system’s specification) implies that for any enrolled user Alice and for any SP, Alice is able to successfully authenticate herself to the SP with overwhelming probability if Alice has been blacklisted by the SP fewer than a specified threshold number of times.

**DEFINITION 2 SECURITY.** A construction of the BLAC system is secure if it has *mis-authentication resistance*, *blacklistability*, *anonymity* and *non-frameability*.

To complete the above definition for BLAC’s security (Definition 2), we must define each of the four notions *mis-authentication resistance*, *blacklistability*, *anonymity* and *non-frameability*. Below we first give an informal explanation. We dedicate the next subsection (Section 4.3) for a formal treatment.

**4.2.1 *Mis-authentication Resistance.*** Mis-authentication occurs when an unregistered user successfully authenticates herself to an SP. In a BLAC construction with *mis-authentication resistance*, SPs are assured to accept authentications from only enrolled users.

**4.2.2 *Blacklistability.*** Any SP may blacklist a user who has authenticated successfully at any later time. In a BLAC construction with *blacklistability*, SPs are assured to accept authentications from only well-behaving users, i.e., users who are blacklisted fewer than a threshold number of times. As a consequence, misbehaving users are revoked from the system, and they will no longer be able to successfully authenticate themselves to the SP (even if they collude with other SPs) until enough misbehaviors of theirs are unblacklisted by the SP.

**4.2.3 *Anonymity.*** In a system with *anonymity*, all that SPs can infer about the identity of an authenticating user is whether the user is or was revoked at the time of protocol execution, regardless of whatever the SPs do afterwards, such as arbitrarily manipulating their blacklists or colluding together with a malicious GM.

<sup>8</sup>We do not define the equivalence of tickets here because it is construction-dependent.

4.2.4 *Non-frameability*. A user Alice is framed if she is not currently revoked by an honest SP, but is unable to successfully authenticate herself to the SP. In a BLAC construction with *non-frameability*, well-behaving users can always successfully authenticate themselves to honest SPs, even if all other SPs, users and GM collude together.

### 4.3 Formal Security Definitions

We use a game-based approach to define the notion of security formally. The adversary's capabilities are modeled by arbitrary and adaptive queries to oracles, which are stateful and together share a private state denoted as **state**, which contains three counters  $i, j, k$  (for indexing the users, SPs, and authentications, resp.), and six sets  $\mathcal{I}, \mathcal{I}_U, \mathcal{I}_G$  (user-related index sets),  $\mathcal{J}, \mathcal{J}_S$  (SP-related index sets), and  $\mathcal{K}_U$  (authentication-related index set). Initially, the three counters are 0 and the six sets are  $\emptyset$ . We next describe the oracles, which are simulated by the simulator  $\mathcal{S}$  during the games.

- REG(). This oracle allows the adversary to register an honest user with the honest GM. Upon invocation, the oracle increments  $i$  by 1, simulates the *Registration* protocol between an honest user and the honest GM, sets  $\mathbf{state} := \mathbf{state} \parallel \langle i, \varpi_i, \mathbf{cred}_i \rangle$ , where  $\varpi_i$  is the resulting protocol transcript and  $\mathbf{cred}_i$  is the resulting user credential, adds  $i$  to  $\mathcal{I}$  and finally outputs  $(\varpi_i, i)$  to the adversary. The newly registered user is indexed by  $i$ .
- REG<sub>U</sub>(). This oracle allows the adversary to register a corrupt user with the honest GM. Upon invocation, the oracle increments  $i$  by 1, plays the role of the GM and interacts with the adversary in the *Registration* protocol, sets  $\mathbf{state} := \mathbf{state} \parallel \langle i, \varpi_i, \perp \rangle$ , where  $\varpi_i$  is the protocol transcript, adds  $i$  to  $\mathcal{I}_U$  and finally outputs  $i$  to the adversary. The user is indexed by  $i$ .
- REG<sub>G</sub>(). This oracle allows the adversary to register an honest user with the corrupt GM. Upon invocation, the oracle increments  $i$  by 1, plays the role of a user and interacts with the adversary in the *Registration* protocol, sets  $\mathbf{state} := \mathbf{state} \parallel \langle i, \perp, \mathbf{cred}_i \rangle$ , where  $\mathbf{cred}_i$  is the credential issued to the user by the adversary, adds  $i$  to  $\mathcal{I}_G$  and finally outputs  $i$  to the adversary. The user is indexed by  $i$ .
- CORRUPT-U( $i$ ). This oracle allows the adversary to corrupt an honest user. On input  $i \in \mathcal{I} \cup \mathcal{I}_G$ , the oracle removes  $i$  from  $\mathcal{I}$  and  $\mathcal{I}_G$ , adds  $i$  to  $\mathcal{I}_U$ , and finally outputs  $\mathbf{cred}_i$  to the adversary.
- ADD-SP( $\mathbf{sid}$ ). This oracle allows the adversary to introduce an SP with *fresh* identity  $\mathbf{sid} \in \{0, 1\}^*$  into the system. Upon invocation, the oracle increments  $j$  by 1, adds it to  $\mathcal{J}$ , and finally outputs it to the adversary. The SP is indexed by  $j$ .
- CORRUPT-SP( $j$ ). This oracle allows the adversary to corrupt an honest SP. On input  $j \in \mathcal{J}$ , the oracle removes  $j$  from  $\mathcal{J}$  and adds it to  $\mathcal{J}_S$ .
- AUTH( $i, j, d$ ). This oracle allows the adversary to eavesdrop an authentication run between an honest user and an honest SP. On input  $(i, j, d)$  such that  $i \in \mathcal{I} \cup \mathcal{I}_G$ ,  $j \in \mathcal{J}$  and  $d \in \mathbb{N}$ , the oracle increments  $k$  by 1, simulates (using  $\mathbf{cred}_i$ ) the *Authentication* protocol between honest user  $i$  and honest SP  $j$  assuming a

threshold value of  $d$ , sets  $\text{state} := \text{state} \parallel \langle k, \varpi_k \rangle$ , where  $\varpi_k$  is the resulting protocol transcript, and finally outputs  $(k, \varpi_k)$  to the adversary.

- $\text{AUTH}_U(j, d)$ . This oracle allows a corrupt user to authenticate to an honest SP. On input  $j \in \mathcal{J}$  and  $d \in \mathbb{N}$ , the oracle increments  $k$  by 1, plays the role of SP  $j$  assuming a threshold value of  $d$  and interacts with the adversary in the *Authentication* protocol, adds  $k$  to  $\mathcal{K}_U$ , sets  $\text{state} := \text{state} \parallel \langle k, \varpi_k \rangle$ , where  $\varpi_k$  is the resulting protocol transcript, and finally outputs  $k$  to the adversary.
- $\text{AUTH}_S(i, j)$ . This oracle allows the adversary to have an honest user authenticate to a corrupt SP. On input  $i \in \mathcal{I} \cup \mathcal{I}_G$  and  $j \in \mathcal{J}_S$ , the oracle increments  $k$  by 1, plays the role of user  $i$  to authenticate to SP  $j$  and interacts with the adversary in the *Authentication* protocol, sets  $\text{state} := \text{state} \parallel \langle k, \varpi_k \rangle$ , where  $\varpi_k$  is the resulting protocol transcript, and finally outputs  $k$  to the adversary.
- $\text{ADD-TO-BL}(j, k)$ . This oracle allows the adversary to influence an honest SP to judge a user as having misbehaved during an authenticated session. On input  $j \in \mathcal{J}$  and  $k \in [k]$ , the oracle adds the ticket  $\tau_k = \text{Extract}(\varpi_k)$  to SP  $j$ 's blacklist.
- $\text{REMOVE-FROM-BL}(j, \tau)$ . This oracle allows the adversary to influence an honest SP to forgive a user for her misbehavior during an authenticated session. On input  $j \in \mathcal{J}$  and  $\tau$  such that  $\tau$  is in SP  $j$ 's blacklist, the oracle removes  $\tau$  from that blacklist.

We remark that queries to  $\text{REG}$  and  $\text{REG}_U$  do not interleave because the honest GM registers users one at a time; queries to  $\text{ADD-TO-BL}(j, \cdot)$  and  $\text{REMOVE-FROM-BL}(j, \cdot)$  do not interleave with one another, or with queries to  $\text{AUTH}$  or  $\text{AUTH}_U$  because honest SPs update their blacklists only when no authentication is in progress. Queries to  $\text{AUTH}$  is atomic, but we allow interleaving among queries to  $\text{AUTH}$ ,  $\text{AUTH}_U$  and  $\text{AUTH}_S$ .

**4.3.1 Mis-authentication resistance and blacklistability.** The property of mis-authentication resistance is implied by the property of blacklistability: if someone can authenticate to an SP without having registered, she can authenticate after being blacklisted by mounting an attack against mis-authentication resistance. The following game between the simulator  $\mathcal{S}$  and the adversary  $\mathcal{A}$  formally defines Blacklistability.

*Setup Phase.*  $\mathcal{S}$  takes a sufficiently large security parameter and generates  $\text{gpk}$  and  $\text{gsk}$  according to *Setup*.  $\text{gpk}$  is given to  $\mathcal{A}$ .

*Probing Phase.*  $\mathcal{A}$  is allowed to issue queries to all the oracles except  $\text{REG}_G$ . In other words, the GM is always honest.

*End Game Phase.*  $\mathcal{A}$  outputs  $j, n \in \mathbb{N}$  and  $k_1, k_2, \dots, k_n \in \mathbb{N}$ .

Let  $S_{\mathcal{O}}$  be the sequence of all oracle queries made throughout the game in chronological order.  $\mathcal{A}$  wins the game if all of the following hold:

(1) There exist  $d_1, d_2, \dots, d_n \in \mathbb{N}$  such that the sequence  $S_{\mathcal{O}}^* =$

$$\left( \begin{array}{ll} k_1 \leftarrow \text{AUTH}_{\mathcal{U}}(j, d_1), & \text{ADD-TO-BL}(j, k_1), \\ k_2 \leftarrow \text{AUTH}_{\mathcal{U}}(j, d_2), & \text{ADD-TO-BL}(j, k_2), \\ & \vdots \\ k_{n-1} \leftarrow \text{AUTH}_{\mathcal{U}}(j, d_{n-1}), & \text{ADD-TO-BL}(j, k_{n-1}), \\ k_n \leftarrow \text{AUTH}_{\mathcal{U}}(j, d_n) & \end{array} \right)$$

is a subsequence of  $S_{\mathcal{O}}$ .

- (2) In all  $n$   $\text{AUTH}_{\mathcal{U}}$  queries in  $S_{\mathcal{O}}^*$ , the honest SP  $j$  as simulated by  $\mathcal{S}$  terminated the *Authentication* protocol successfully.
- (3) Without loss of generality, before the query  $k_n \leftarrow \text{AUTH}_{\mathcal{U}}(j, d_n)$ ,  $\mathcal{A}$  never queried  $\text{REMOVE-FROM-BL}(j, \text{Extract}(\varpi_{k_i}))$ , where  $\langle k_i, \varpi_{k_i} \rangle \in \text{state}$ , for all  $i \in [n-1]$ .
- (4) Either  $|\mathcal{I}_{\mathcal{U}}| = 0$  or the sequence  $D = (d_1, d_2, \dots, d_n)$  is *not*  $|\mathcal{I}_{\mathcal{U}}|$ -partitionable. (For the definition of partitionability, see Section 3.1.)

This completes the description of the game.

Throughout the game, adversary  $\mathcal{A}$  has corrupted  $|\mathcal{I}_{\mathcal{U}}|$  registered users. If  $|\mathcal{I}_{\mathcal{U}}| = 0$ , then the existence of even a single successful  $\text{AUTH}_{\mathcal{U}}$  query implies that the adversary has broken mis-authentication resistance and thus blacklistability. Otherwise, i.e.,  $|\mathcal{I}_{\mathcal{U}}| > 0$ , the adversary wins only if  $D$  is not  $|\mathcal{I}_{\mathcal{U}}|$ -partitionable. Below we provide more explanation for this latter case.

Consider the contrary that  $D$  is  $|\mathcal{I}_{\mathcal{U}}|$ -partitionable. Let  $P = (D_1, D_2, \dots, D_{|\mathcal{I}_{\mathcal{U}}|})$  be one such partitioning. Adversary  $\mathcal{A}$  could have successfully made the  $n$   $\text{AUTH}_{\mathcal{U}}$  queries in  $D$  according to the following strategy: use the credential of the  $i$ -th corrupted user in the  $j$ -th  $\text{AUTH}_{\mathcal{U}}$  query if  $d_j \in D_i$ . This strategy is always feasible for any BLAC construction with the *correctness* property;  $D$  could simply have been a sequence of legitimate authentications in the system where there are only honest participants. Therefore, an  $|\mathcal{I}_{\mathcal{U}}|$ -partitionable sequence  $D$  is *not* considered as a breach in blacklistability and thus a victory of the adversary in the game.

Now, consider the case when  $D = (d_1, \dots, d_n)$  is *indeed not*  $|\mathcal{I}_{\mathcal{U}}|$ -partitionable. There is always an  $n' \leq n$  such that  $D' = (d_1, \dots, d_{n'})$  is also *not*  $|\mathcal{I}_{\mathcal{U}}|$ -partitionable. Let  $n^*$  be the smallest such  $n'$ . The  $n^*$ -th  $\text{AUTH}_{\mathcal{U}}$  is considered to be a breach in blacklistability for the following reason: no matter in what order and who among any group of  $|\mathcal{I}_{\mathcal{U}}|$  honest registered users have authenticated in the first  $n^* - 1$  successful authentications, each of them has already authenticated at least  $d_{n^*}$  times by the time the  $n^*$ -th authentication is about to be made. Since the  $n^*$ -th authentication has a threshold value of  $d_{n^*}$ , none of them should be able to successfully authenticate in the  $n^*$ -th authentication.

**4.3.2 Anonymity.** The following game between the simulator  $\mathcal{S}$  and adversary  $\mathcal{A}$  formally defines anonymity.

*Setup Phase.*  $\mathcal{S}$  takes a sufficiently large security parameter and generates  $\text{gpk}$  and  $\text{gsk}$ , which are given to  $\mathcal{A}$ .

*Probing Phase.*  $\mathcal{A}$  is allowed to issue queries to all the oracles except  $\text{REG}$  and  $\text{REG}_{\mathcal{U}}$ . Oracle queries can be interleaved and/or span the Challenge Phase and

Probing Phase 2.

*Challenge Phase.*  $\mathcal{A}$  outputs  $i_0^*, i_1^* \in \mathcal{I}_G$ ,  $j^* \in [j]$  and  $d^* \in \mathbb{N}$ .  $\mathcal{S}$  then flips a fair coin  $\hat{b} \in \{0, 1\}$ .  $\mathcal{A}$  queries  $\text{AUTH}(\perp, j^*, d^*)$  if  $j^* \in \mathcal{J}$ , or  $\text{AUTH}_S(j^*, d^*)$  otherwise. Notice that  $\mathcal{A}$  leaves  $i$  unspecified in either query.  $\mathcal{S}$  answers the query assuming  $i = i_b^*$ . Let  $\varpi_k^*$  be the resulting transcript. Furthermore, let  $d_0^*$  (resp.  $d_1^*$ ) be the current number of tickets on the blacklist sent from SP  $j^*$  to  $\mathcal{S}$  during the  $\text{AUTH}$  or  $\text{AUTH}_S$  query that are extracted from the transcript of an authentication involving user  $i_0^*$  (resp.  $i_1^*$ ).

*Probing Phase 2.*  $\mathcal{A}$  is allowed to issue queries as in the Probing Phase, except that queries to  $\text{CORRUPT-U}(i_0^*)$  or  $\text{CORRUPT-U}(i_1^*)$  are not allowed.

*End Game Phase.*  $\mathcal{A}$  outputs a guess bit  $b'$ .  $\mathcal{A}$  wins the game if  $\hat{b} = b'$  and at least one of the following is true:

- (Case I.) Both  $d_0^*$  and  $d_1^*$  are smaller than  $d^*$  and  $\mathcal{A}$  never queried  $\text{ADD-TO-BL}(*, k^*)$ .
- (Case II.) Both  $d_0^*$  and  $d_1^*$  are greater than or equal to  $d^*$ .

The condition of Case I implies that  $\mathcal{A}$  cannot blacklist the challenge authentication in an attempt to break anonymity. This prevents the trivial attack in which  $\mathcal{A}$  simply blacklists the authentication and has the two users ( $i_0^*$  and  $i_1^*$ ) attempt to authenticate. Whoever fails to authenticate will be the underlying user of the challenge authentication.

**4.3.3 Non-frameability.** The following game between the simulator  $\mathcal{S}$  and the adversary  $\mathcal{A}$  formally defines Non-frameability.

*Setup Phase.*  $\mathcal{S}$  takes a sufficiently large security parameter and generates  $\text{gpk}$  and  $\text{gsk}$ , which are given to  $\mathcal{A}$ .

*Probing Phase.*  $\mathcal{A}$  is allowed to issue queries to all the oracles except  $\text{REG}$  and  $\text{REG}_U$ . Oracle queries may span over the End Game Phase.

*End Game Phase.*  $\mathcal{A}$  outputs  $i^* \in \mathcal{I}_G$ ,  $j^* \in \mathcal{J}$  and  $d^* \in \mathbb{N}$ . Let  $d_i^*$  be the number of unique  $\text{ADD-TO-BL}(j^*, k)$ , where  $k$  is such that  $(\cdot, k)$  is the output of a  $\text{AUTH}(i^*, j^*, \cdot)$  query, minus the number of unique  $\text{REMOVE-FROM-BL}(j^*, \tau)$ , where  $\tau$  is the ticket extracted from the transcript of an authentication involving user  $i^*$ .  $\mathcal{S}$  then runs  $\text{AUTH}(i^*, j^*, d^*)$ .  $\mathcal{A}$  wins the game if  $d^* > d_i^*$  and SP terminates *unsuccessfully* in the  $\text{AUTH}$  query.

## 5. SYSTEM CONSTRUCTION

We now detail our cryptographic construction and assess its security and efficiency. For simplicity, we first present our construction without flexible blacklisting, and then show how the construction can be extended to support a  $d$ -strikes-out revocation policy.

### 5.1 Parameters

Let  $\lambda, \ell$  be sufficiently large security parameters. Let  $(\mathbb{G}_1, \mathbb{G}_2)$  be a bilinear group pair with computable isomorphism  $\psi$  as discussed such that  $|\mathbb{G}_1| = |\mathbb{G}_2| = p$  for some prime  $p$  of  $\lambda$  bits. Also let  $\mathbb{G}$  be a group of order  $p$  where DDH is intractable. Let  $g_0, g_1, g_2 \in \mathbb{G}_1$  and  $h_0 \in \mathbb{G}_2$  be generators of  $\mathbb{G}_1$  and  $\mathbb{G}_2$  respectively such that

$g_0 = \psi(h_0)$  and the relative discrete logarithm of the generators are unknown.<sup>9</sup> Let  $H_0 : \{0, 1\}^* \rightarrow \mathbb{G}$  and  $H : \{0, 1\}^* \rightarrow \mathbb{Z}_p$  be secure cryptographic hash functions.

## 5.2 Setup

The GM randomly chooses  $\gamma \in_R \mathbb{Z}_p$  and computes  $w = h_0^\gamma$ . The group secret key is  $\text{gsk} = (\gamma)$  and the group public key is  $\text{gpk} = (w)$ .

## 5.3 Registration

Upon successful termination of this protocol between a user Alice and the GM, Alice obtains a credential in the form of  $(A, e, x, y)$  such that  $A^{e+\gamma} = g_0 g_1^x g_2^y$ . We note that  $x$  and  $y$  are known only to Alice (i.e., but not the GM). The private input to the GM is the group secret key  $\text{gsk}$ .

- (1) The GM sends  $m$  to Alice, where  $m \in_R \{0, 1\}^\ell$  is a random challenge.
- (2) Alice sends a pair  $(C, \Pi_1)$  to the GM, where  $C = g_1^x g_2^{y'} \in \mathbb{G}_1$  is a commitment of  $(x, y') \in_R \mathbb{Z}_p^2$  and  $\Pi_1$  is a signature proof of knowledge of

$$\text{SPK}_1 \left\{ (x, y') : C = g_1^x g_2^{y'} \right\} (m) \quad (1)$$

on challenge  $m$ , which proves that  $C$  is correctly formed.

- (3) The GM returns **failure** if the verification of  $\Pi_1$  returns **invalid**. Otherwise the GM sends Alice a tuple  $(A, e, y'')$ , where  $e, y'' \in_R \mathbb{Z}_p$  and  $A = (g_0 C g_2^{y''})^{\frac{1}{e+\gamma}} \in \mathbb{G}_1$ .
- (4) Alice computes  $y = y' + y''$ . She returns **failure** if  $\hat{e}(A, w h_0^e) \neq \hat{e}(g_0 g_1^x g_2^y, h_0)$ . Otherwise she outputs  $\text{cred} = (A, e, x, y)$  as her credential.

To prevent the possibility of a concurrent attack [Damgård 2000], we require that users must be registered sequentially.

## 5.4 Authentication: The Special Case

We first describe the protocol construction assuming the special case when the SP enforces a 1-strike-out revocation policy, i.e., it uses a threshold value of 1. In the next subsection, we show how the construction can be extended to allow a  $d$ -strike-out revocation policy, with any  $d \geq 1$ .

During an execution of this protocol between a user Alice and the SP, Alice's private input is her credential  $\text{cred} = (A, e, x, y)$ . Let  $\text{sid} \in \{0, 1\}^*$  be the string that uniquely identifies the SP. When the protocol terminates, the SP outputs **success** or **failure**, indicating whether the SP should consider the authentication attempt successful.

- (1) (*Challenge.*) The SP sends to Alice a pair  $(\text{BL}, m)$ , where  $m \in_R \{0, 1\}^\ell$  is a random challenge and  $\text{BL} = \langle \tau_1, \dots, \tau_n \rangle$  is its current blacklist and  $\tau_i = (s_i, t_i) \in \{0, 1\}^\ell \times \mathbb{G}$ , for  $i = 1$  to  $n$ , is the  $i$ -th ticket in the blacklist.
- (2) (*Blacklist Inspection.*) Alice computes, for  $i = 1$  to  $n$ , the bases  $b_i = H_0(s_i || \text{sid})$ . She returns as **failure** if  $\text{tag } t_i = b_i^x$  for some  $i$  (indicating that she is blacklisted). She proceeds otherwise.

<sup>9</sup>This can be done by setting the generators to be the output of a cryptographic hash function of some publicly known seeds.

- (3) (*Proof Generation.*) Alice returns to the SP a pair  $(\tau, \Pi_2)$ , where  $\tau = (s, t) \in \{0, 1\}^\ell \times \mathbb{G}$  is a ticket generated by randomly choosing a serial  $s \in_R \{0, 1\}^\ell$  and computing the base  $b$  as  $H_0(s||\mathbf{sid})$  and then the tag  $t$  as  $b^x$ , and  $\Pi_2$  is a signature proof of knowledge of:

$$SPK_2 \left\{ (A, e, x, y) : A^{e+\gamma} = g_0 g_1^x g_2^y \wedge t = b^x \wedge \left( \bigwedge_{i \in [n]} t_i \neq b_i^x \right) \right\} (m) \quad (2)$$

on the challenge  $m$ , which proves:

- (a)  $A^{e+\gamma} = g_0 g_1^x g_2^y$ , i.e., Alice is a group member,
  - (b)  $t = b^x = H_0(s||\mathbf{sid})^x$ , i.e., the ticket  $\tau$  is correctly formed, and
  - (c)  $\bigwedge_{i=1}^n t_i \neq H_0(s_i||\mathbf{sid})^x$ , i.e., Alice is not currently on the SP's blacklist.
- (4) (*Proof Verification.*) The SP returns **failure** if the verification of  $\Pi_2$  returns **invalid**.<sup>10</sup> Otherwise it returns **success**.

The protocol transcript of a successful authentication at the SP is thus  $\varpi = (\mathbf{sid}, BL, m, \tau, \Pi_2)$ . The SP stores ticket  $\tau$  extracted from the transcript, along with information logging Alice's activity within the authenticated session.

### 5.5 Authentication: The General Case

We now modify the protocol for *Authentication* presented in Section 5.4 to support a  $d$ -strikes-out revocation policy. Our extension does not alter the time and communication complexities of the authentication protocol, which remain  $O(n)$ , where  $n$  is the size of the blacklist.

The inputs to each of user Alice and the SP in the protocol in the general case are the same as those in the special case, except that the SP additionally gets a threshold value  $d$ . When the protocol terminates, the SP outputs **success** or **failure**, indicating whether the SP should consider the authentication attempt successful. Authentication succeeds only if there are less than  $d$  entries corresponding to Alice's credential in the blacklist.

- (1) (*Challenge.*) In addition to  $(BL, m)$ , the SP sends to Alice the threshold value  $d \in [n]$ , where  $n$  is the size of  $BL$ .
- (2) (*Blacklist Inspection.*) Alice computes, for  $i = 1$  to  $n$ , the bases  $b_i = H_0(s_i||\mathbf{sid})$ . She returns **failure** if tag  $t_i = b_i^x$  for  $d$  or more distinct  $i$ 's (indicating that she has reached the blacklisting threshold). She proceeds otherwise.
- (3) (*Proof Generation.*)  $\Pi_2$  is instead a signature proof of knowledge of:

$$SPK_3 \left\{ (A, e, x, y) : \begin{array}{l} A^{e+\gamma} = g_0 g_1^x g_2^y \wedge t = b^x \wedge \\ \left( \bigvee_{\mathcal{I} \subseteq_{(n-d+1)} [n]} \bigwedge_{i \in \mathcal{I}} t_i \neq b_i^x \right) \end{array} \right\} (m) \quad (3)$$

on the challenge  $m$ , which proves:

- (a)  $A^{e+\gamma} = g_0 g_1^x g_2^y$ , i.e., Alice is a group member,

<sup>10</sup>The SP also terminates with **failure** if the blacklist is being updated concurrently. This behavior ensures that if a user is blacklisted at time  $t$ , she cannot authenticate to the SP after time  $t$ , until she is unblacklisted.

- (b)  $t = H_0(s||\mathbf{sid})^x$ , i.e., the ticket  $\tau$  is correctly formed, and
- (c)  $\bigwedge_{i=1}^n t_i \neq H_0(s_i||\mathbf{sid})^x$ , i.e., Alice is not currently on the SP's blacklist  $d$  times or more.

(4) (*Proof Verification.*) The verification of  $\Pi_2$  changes accordingly.

The protocol transcript of a successful authentication at the SP thus becomes  $\varpi = \langle \mathbf{sid}, \text{BL}, m, d, \tau, \Pi_2 \rangle$ .

## 5.6 Blacklist Management

The three algorithms are all very simple and efficient.  $\text{Extract}(\varpi)$  returns ticket  $\tau$  in the input transcript  $\varpi = \langle \text{BL}, m, \tau, \Pi_2 \rangle$ .  $\text{Add}(\text{BL}, \tau)$  returns blacklist  $\text{BL}'$ , which is the same as the input blacklist  $\text{BL}$ , except with the input ticket  $\tau$  appended to it.  $\text{Remove}(\text{BL}, \tau)$  returns blacklist  $\text{BL}'$ , which is the same as the input blacklist  $\text{BL}$ , except with all entries equal to the input ticket  $\tau$  dropped.

## 6. INSTANTIATION OF ZKPOK PROTOCOLS

The ZKPoK protocols  $SPK_1$ ,  $SPK_2$  and  $SPK_3$  presented above require instantiation. We omit spelling out the relatively trivial instantiation of  $SPK_1$ . In the following, we instantiate  $SPK_3$ . Note that  $SPK_2$  is a special case of  $SPK_3$  at  $d = 1$ .

Below, we write  $\hat{e}(g_i, h_0)$  as  $\hat{\mathbf{e}}_i$ , for  $i = 0$  to 2.

### 6.1 $SPK_3$

6.1.1 *Signing.* Let  $(A, e, x, y) \in \mathbb{G}_1 \times \mathbb{Z}_p^3$  be a tuple such that  $A^{e+\gamma} = g_0 g_1^x g_2^y$ ,  $t = b^x$ , and  $\bigwedge_{i \in \mathcal{J}} (t_i \neq b_i^x)$  for some  $\mathcal{J} \subseteq_{(n-d+1)} [n]$ . To produce a proof  $\Pi_3$  for  $SPK_3$  on message  $m \in \{0, 1\}^*$ , a prover with the knowledge of  $(A, e, x, y)$  does the following.

(1) Produce auxiliary commitments

$$\mathbf{aux} = (C_1, C_2, C_3, \tilde{C}_1, \tilde{C}_2, \dots, \tilde{C}_n)$$

as follows. First pick  $\rho_1, \rho_2, \rho_3, \rho_4 \in_R \mathbb{Z}_p$  and compute  $C_1 = g_1^{\rho_1} g_2^{\rho_2}$ ,  $C_2 = A g_2^{\rho_1}$ , and  $C_3 = g_1^{\rho_3} g_2^{\rho_4}$ . Then pick  $\tilde{C}_i \in_R \mathbb{G}$  for all  $i \in [n] \setminus \mathcal{J}$ , pick  $r_i \in_R \mathbb{Z}_p$  for all  $i \in \mathcal{J}$  and compute  $\tilde{C}_i = (b_i^x / t_i)^{r_i}$  for all  $i \in \mathcal{J}$ .

(2) Return  $\Pi_3$  as  $(\mathbf{aux}, \Pi_4, \Pi_5)$ , where  $\Pi_4$  and  $\Pi_5$  are respectively signature proofs of knowledge of:

$$SPK_4 \left\{ \left( \begin{array}{l} e, x, y, \\ \rho_1, \rho_2, \rho_3, \rho_4, \\ \alpha_1, \alpha_2, \beta_3, \beta_4 \end{array} \right) : \frac{\hat{e}(C_2, w)}{\hat{\mathbf{e}}_0} = \hat{e}(C_2, h_0)^{-e} \hat{\mathbf{e}}_1^x \hat{\mathbf{e}}_2^{y+\alpha_1} \hat{e}(g_2, w)^{\rho_1} \wedge \right. \\ \left. \begin{array}{l} C_1 = g_1^{\rho_1} g_2^{\rho_2} \wedge 1 = C_1^{-e} g_1^{\alpha_1} g_2^{\alpha_2} \wedge \\ C_3 = g_1^{\rho_3} g_2^{\rho_4} \wedge 1 = C_3^{-x} g_1^{\beta_3} g_2^{\beta_4} \wedge \\ 1 = b^{\beta_3} t^{-\rho_3} \end{array} \right\} (\hat{m})$$

$$SPK_5 \left\{ (\mu_i, r_i)_{i \in [n]} : \bigvee_{\mathcal{I} \subseteq_{(n-d+1)} [n]} \bigwedge_{i \in \mathcal{I}} (1 = b^{\mu_i} t^{-r_i} \wedge \tilde{C}_i = b_i^{\mu_i} t_i^{-r_i}) \right\} (\hat{m})$$

on message  $\hat{m} = \mathbf{aux} || m$ .  $\Pi_4$  can be computed using the knowledge of

$$(e, x, y, \rho_1, \rho_2, \rho_3, \rho_4, \alpha_1, \alpha_2, \beta_3, \beta_4),$$



where  $\alpha_1 = \rho_1 e$ ,  $\alpha_2 = \rho_2 e$ ,  $\beta_3 = \rho_3 x$  and  $\beta_4 = \rho_4 x$ ;  $\Pi_5$  can be computed using the knowledge of  $(\mu_i, r_i)_{i \in \mathcal{J}}$ , where  $\mu_i = r_i x$  for all  $i \in \mathcal{J}$ .

**6.1.2 Verification.** To verify a proof  $\Pi_3 = (\text{aux}, \Pi_4, \Pi_5)$  for  $SPK_3$  on message  $m$  where  $\text{aux} = (C_1, C_2, C_3, \tilde{C}_1, \tilde{C}_2, \dots, \tilde{C}_n)$ , return **valid** if the verification of both  $\Pi_3$  and  $\Pi_4$  on  $\hat{m} = \text{aux}||m$  returns **valid**, and  $\tilde{C}_i \neq 1$  for all  $i = 1$  to  $n$ . Return **invalid** otherwise.

Below we enumerate the instantiation of  $SPK_4$  and  $SPK_5$ .

## 6.2 $SPK_4$

**6.2.1 Signing.** To produce a proof  $\Pi_4$  for  $SPK_4$  on message  $\hat{m} \in \{0, 1\}^*$ , do the following:

(1) (*Commit.*) Pick  $r_e, r_x, r_y, r_{\rho_1}, r_{\rho_2}, r_{\rho_3}, r_{\rho_4}, r_{\alpha_1}, r_{\alpha_2}, r_{\beta_3}, r_{\beta_4} \in_R \mathbb{Z}_p^*$  and compute

$$T_1 = g_1^{r_{\rho_1}} g_2^{r_{\rho_2}}, \quad T_2 = C_1^{-r_e} g_1^{r_{\alpha_1}} g_2^{r_{\alpha_2}}, \quad T_3 = g_1^{r_{\rho_3}} g_2^{r_{\rho_4}}, \quad T_4 = C_3^{-r_x} g_1^{r_{\beta_3}} g_2^{r_{\beta_4}},$$

$$T_5 = \hat{e}(C_2, h_0)^{-r_e} \cdot \hat{\mathbf{e}}_1^{r_x} \cdot \hat{\mathbf{e}}_2^{r_y + r_{\alpha_1}} \cdot \hat{e}(g_2, w)^{r_{\rho_1}}, \quad T = b^{r_{\beta_3}} t^{-r_{\rho_3}}.$$

(2) (*Challenge.*) Compute  $c = H(T_1, \dots, T_5, T, \hat{m})$ .

(3) (*Respond.*) Compute

$$s_e = r_e - ce, \quad s_x = r_x - cx, \quad s_y = r_y - cy,$$

$$s_{\rho_i} = r_{\rho_i} - c\rho_i \quad \text{for } i = 1 \text{ to } 4,$$

$$s_{\alpha_i} = r_{\alpha_i} - c\rho_i e \quad \text{for } i = 1, 2, \text{ and } s_{\beta_i} = r_{\beta_i} - c\rho_i x \quad \text{for } i = 3, 4.$$

(4) (*Output.*) The signature proof of knowledge  $\Pi_4$  on  $\hat{m}$  is

$$\Pi_4 = (c, s_e, s_x, s_y, s_{\rho_1}, s_{\rho_2}, s_{\rho_3}, s_{\rho_4}, s_{\alpha_1}, s_{\alpha_2}, s_{\beta_3}, s_{\beta_4}).$$

**6.2.2 Verification.** To verify a proof  $\Pi_4$  for  $SPK_4$  on message  $\hat{m}$ , do the following:

(1) Compute

$$T'_1 = g_1^{s_{\rho_1}} g_2^{s_{\rho_2}} C_1^c, \quad T'_2 = C_1^{-s_e} g_1^{s_{\alpha_1}} g_2^{s_{\alpha_2}}, \quad T'_3 = g_1^{s_{\rho_3}} g_2^{s_{\rho_4}} C_3^c, \quad T'_4 = C_3^{-s_x} g_1^{s_{\beta_3}} g_2^{s_{\beta_4}},$$

$$T'_5 = \hat{e}(C_2, h_0)^{-s_e} \cdot \hat{\mathbf{e}}_1^{s_x} \cdot \hat{\mathbf{e}}_2^{s_y + s_{\alpha_1}} \cdot \hat{e}(g_2, w)^{s_{\rho_1}} \cdot \left( \frac{\hat{e}(C_2, w)}{\hat{\mathbf{e}}_0} \right)^c, \quad T' = b^{s_{\beta_3}} t^{-s_{\rho_3}}.$$

(2) Return **valid** if  $c = H(T'_1, \dots, T'_5, T', \hat{m})$ . Return **invalid** otherwise.

## 6.3 $SPK_5$

**6.3.1 Signing.** To produce a proof  $\Pi_5$  for  $SPK_5$  on message  $\hat{m} \in \{0, 1\}^*$ , do the following:

(1) (*Commit.*) Pick  $r_{\mu_i}, r_{r_i} \in_R \mathbb{Z}_p$  for all  $i \in \mathcal{J}$  and pick  $c_i, s_{\mu_i}, s_{r_i} \in_R \mathbb{Z}_p^*$  for all  $i \in [n] \setminus \mathcal{J}$ . Then compute

$$T_i = \begin{cases} b^{r_{\mu_i}} t^{-r_{r_i}}, & i \in \mathcal{J}, \\ b^{s_{\mu_i}} t^{-s_{r_i}}, & i \in [n] \setminus \mathcal{J}, \end{cases} \quad \text{and} \quad \tilde{T}_i = \begin{cases} b_i^{r_{\mu_i}} t_i^{-r_{r_i}}, & i \in \mathcal{J}, \\ b_i^{s_{\mu_i}} t_i^{-s_{r_i}} \tilde{C}_i^{c_i}, & i \in [n] \setminus \mathcal{J}. \end{cases}$$

- (2) (*Challenge.*) Compute  $c_0 = H((T_i, \tilde{T}_i)_{i=1}^n, \hat{m})$ . Construct a polynomial  $f$  over  $\mathbb{Z}_p^*$  of degree at most  $(d-1)$  such that  $c_i = f(i)$  for all  $i \in \{0\} \cup [n] \setminus \mathcal{J}$ . Compute  $c_i = f(i)$  for all  $i \in \mathcal{J}$ .
- (3) (*Respond.*) Compute, for all  $i \in \mathcal{J}$ ,  $s_{\mu_i} = r_{\mu_i} - c_i \mu_i$  and  $s_{r_i} = r_{r_i} - c_i r_i$ .
- (4) (*Output.*) The signature proof of knowledge  $\Pi_4$  on  $\hat{m}$  is:

$$\Pi_4 = (f, (s_{\mu_i}, s_{r_i})_{i \in [n]}).$$

6.3.2 *Verification.* To verify a proof  $\Pi_5$  for  $SPK_5$  on message  $\hat{m}$ , do the following:

- (1) Compute, for all  $i \in [n]$ ,  $T'_i = b^{s_{\mu_i}} t^{-s_{r_i}}$  and  $\tilde{T}'_i = b_i^{s_{\mu_i}} t_i^{-s_{r_i}} \tilde{C}_i^{f(i)}$ .
- (2) Return **valid** if  $\deg(f) \leq d-1$  and  $f(0) = H((T'_i, \tilde{T}'_i)_{i=1}^n, \hat{m})$ . Return **invalid** otherwise.

## 6.4 Efficiency

Note that among the 5 pairings needed to compute  $T_5$  above, 4 of them are constant and are assumed to be included in the system's parameters. The signer thus only needs to compute one pairing, namely  $e(A_2, h_0)$ . This pairing does not depend on the blacklist and the message, and can thus be precomputed. Similarly, the SP needs to compute two pairings during verification, namely  $e(A_2, h_0)$  and  $e(A_2, w)$ .

## 7. ANALYSIS

### 7.1 Complexities

We analyze the efficiency of our construction in terms of both time and space/communication complexities. First we emphasize that both complexities are independent of the number of users and SPs in the system. Thus our system scales well with respect to these two quantities. Both complexities, however, are dependent on the size of the blacklist. In particular, the communication overhead and the time it takes for both a user and an SP to execute the *Authentication* protocol grow linearly with the current size of the SP's blacklist.

More specifically, a blacklist of size  $n$  contains  $n$  tickets, each consisting of an  $\ell$ -bit string and an element of  $\mathbb{G}$ . A proof  $\Pi_3$  of  $SPK_3$  consists of 3  $\mathbb{G}_1$  elements,  $n$   $\mathbb{G}$  elements and  $3n + 12$   $\mathbb{Z}_p$  elements. The total communication complexity for an authentication is thus  $n + 1$   $\ell$ -bit strings, 3  $\mathbb{G}_1$  elements,  $(2n + 1)$   $\mathbb{G}$  elements and  $3n + 12$   $\mathbb{Z}_p$  elements. SPs need to store a ticket for every successful authentication.

A breakdown of time complexity of the *Authentication* protocol into the number of pairing operations and *multi-exponentiations* (*multi-EXPs*)<sup>11</sup> in various groups is shown in Table I. Operations such as  $\mathbb{G}$  addition and hashing have been omitted as computing them takes relatively insignificant time. Some preprocessing is possible at the user before the knowledge of the challenge message and the blacklist. In fact, all but  $2n$  multi-EXPs in  $\mathbb{G}$  can be precomputed by the user.

<sup>11</sup>A multi-EXP computes the product of exponentiations faster than performing the exponentiations separately. We assume that one multi-EXP operation multiplies up to 3 exponentiations.

Table I. Number of operations during an authentication with a blacklist of size  $n$ .

Operation	User		SP
	w/o Preprocessing	w/ Preprocessing	
$\mathbb{G}_1$ multi-EXP	7	0	4
$\mathbb{G}$ multi-EXP	$3n + 3$	$2n$	$2n + 4$
Pairing	1	0	2

## 7.2 Correctness and Security

The correctness of our construction mostly stems from the correctness of the SPKs. Its proof is thus relatively straightforward. We claim that our construction has *correctness* without proof for the sake of conciseness.

We now state the following theorem about the *security* of our construction, and then sketch its proof.

**THEOREM 1 SECURITY.** *Our construction of BLAC is secure if the  $q$ -SDH problem is hard in  $(\mathbb{G}_1, \mathbb{G}_2)$  and the DDH problem is hard in  $\mathbb{G}$  under the Random Oracle Model.*

**7.2.1 Blacklistability.** Suppose there exists a PPT adversary  $\mathcal{A}$  who can win in game *Blacklistability* with non-negligible probability, we show how to construct a PPT simulator  $\mathcal{S}$  that solves the  $q$ -SDH problem with non-negligible probability.

On input of an instance of the  $q$ -SDH problem  $(g'_0, h'_0, h'_0{}^\gamma, \dots, h'_0{}^{\gamma^q})$ ,  $\mathcal{S}$ 's task is to output a pair  $(\bar{A}, \bar{e})$  such that  $\hat{e}(\bar{A}, h'_0{}^\gamma h'_0{}^{\bar{e}}) = \hat{e}(g'_0, h'_0)$ . We assume that  $\mathcal{A}$  queries REG<sub>U</sub> or CORRUPT-U at most  $q$  times.

Setup Phase  $\mathcal{S}$  randomly generates a degree  $(q - 1)$  polynomial  $f$  such that  $f(x) = \prod_{\iota=1}^{q-1} (x + e_\iota)$ . It computes  $h_0 = h'_0{}^{f(\gamma)}$  and  $w = h_0^\gamma = h'_0{}^{\gamma f(\gamma)}$ . It also computes  $h_1 = [(wh_0^{e_*})^{\nu_1} h_0^{-1}]^{1/\nu_2}$  and  $h_2 = h_1^\mu$  for some  $e_*, \nu_1, \nu_2, \mu \in \mathbb{Z}_p^*$  generated uniformly at random. Next, it computes  $g_\ell = \psi(h_\ell)$  for  $\ell = 0$  to 2. Finally,  $\mathcal{S}$  gives  $(h_0, h_1, h_2, g_0, g_1, g_2, w)$  to  $\mathcal{A}$  as the system parameters. Let  $\mathcal{C}$  be the set  $\{1, \dots, q - 1\} \cup \{*\}$  and  $\mathcal{C}'$  be an empty set  $\emptyset$ .

Probing Phase  $\mathcal{S}$  keeps track of every user in the system. For a user  $i \in \mathcal{I}$ ,  $\mathcal{S}$  simulates the REG() oracle by first selecting  $x_i \in \mathbb{Z}_p^*$  uniformly at random and then using it to simulate the *Registration* protocol. This is possible since the *Registration* protocol has Honest-Verifier Zero-Knowledgeness (HVZK).

When  $\mathcal{A}$  issues CORRUPT-U(i) for user  $i \in \mathcal{I}$ ,  $\mathcal{S}$  chooses  $\varphi$  from set  $\mathcal{C} \setminus \mathcal{C}'$  uniformly at random. If  $\varphi = *$ ,  $\mathcal{S}$  sets  $y_i = (\nu_2 - x_i)/\mu$ ,  $A_i = g^{\nu_1}$  and  $e_i = e_*$ , and returns  $(A_i, e_i, x_i, y_i)$  as the credential of user  $i$ . Otherwise,  $\mathcal{S}$  chooses  $y_i \in \mathbb{Z}_p^*$  uniformly at random, sets  $e_i = e_\varphi$ , computes  $A_i$  as:

$$\begin{aligned}
A_i &= (g_0 g_1^{x_i + \mu y_i})^{\frac{1}{e_i + \gamma}} = g'_0{}^{\frac{f(\gamma)}{e_i + \gamma}} g_1^{\frac{x_i + \mu y_i}{\gamma + e_\varphi}} = g'_0{}^{\frac{f(\gamma)}{e_i + \gamma}} \left( g_0^{\frac{(x_i + \mu y_i)\nu_1(e_* + \gamma) - (x_i + \mu y_i)}{(e_i + \gamma)\nu_2}} \right) \\
&= g'_0{}^{\frac{f(\gamma)}{e_i + \gamma}} \left( 1 - \frac{x_i + \mu y_i}{\nu_2} \right) \left( g_0^{\frac{(x_i + \mu y_i)\nu_1}{\nu_2}} \right)^{\left( 1 - \frac{e_i - e_*}{e_i + \gamma} \right)} \\
&= g'_0{}^{\frac{f(\gamma)}{e_i + \gamma}} \left( 1 - \frac{x_i + \mu y_i}{\nu_2} - \frac{(e_i - e_*)(x_i + \mu y_i)\nu_1}{\nu_2} \right) g_0^{\frac{(x_i + \mu y_i)\nu_1}{\nu_2}},
\end{aligned}$$

and returns  $(A_i, e_i, x_i, y_i)$  as the credential of user  $i$ . In both cases,  $\mathcal{S}$  adds  $\varphi$  to  $\mathcal{C}'$ , removes  $i$  from  $\mathcal{I}$  and adds it to  $\mathcal{I}_U$ .

The simulation of  $\text{REG}_U()$  is similar. Upon receiving  $C$  for user  $i$  (to be added to  $\mathcal{I}_U$ ),  $\mathcal{S}$  first extracts the pair  $(x_i, y'_i)$  by rewinding the adversary and selects  $\varphi$  from  $\mathcal{C} \setminus \mathcal{C}'$  uniformly at random. If  $\varphi = *$ ,  $\mathcal{S}$  chooses  $y''_i$  such that  $x_i + \mu(y'_i + y''_i) = \nu_2$ , sets  $A_i = g^{\nu_1}$ ,  $e_i = e_*$  and finally returns  $(A_i, e_i, y''_i)$ . Otherwise,  $\mathcal{S}$  chooses  $y''_i$  uniformly at random, sets  $e_i = e_\varphi$  and  $y_i = y'_i + y''_i$ , computes  $A_i$  as:

$$A_i = g_0^{\frac{f(\gamma)}{e_i + \gamma}} \left( 1 - \frac{x_i + \mu y_i}{\nu_2} - \frac{(e_i - e_*)(x_i + \mu y_i) \nu_1}{\nu_2} \right) g_0^{\frac{(x_i + \mu y_i) \nu_1}{\nu_2}},$$

and finally returns  $(A_i, e_i, y''_i)$ .  $\mathcal{S}$  adds  $\varphi$  to  $\mathcal{K}'$  in both cases and  $i$  to  $\mathcal{I}_U$ .

$\mathcal{S}$  stores all the credentials issued to  $\mathcal{A}$ . For each SP  $j$ ,  $\mathcal{S}$  maintains a table  $\mathcal{T}_j$  of  $q$  rows. The rows are indexed by elements of  $\mathcal{C}'$  and contain no elements initially.

Let  $j$  be the current counter for SP. For each  $\text{ADD-SP}(\text{sid})$ ,  $\mathcal{S}$  adds  $j$  to  $\mathcal{J}$  and returns  $j$  to  $\mathcal{A}$ .  $\mathcal{S}$  increments  $j$  by 1. For each  $\text{CORRUPT-SP}(j)$ ,  $\mathcal{S}$  removes  $j$  from  $\mathcal{J}$  and adds it to  $\mathcal{J}_S$ .

To simulate  $\text{AUTH}(i, j, d)$  and  $\text{AUTH}_S(i, j)$  for user  $i \in \mathcal{I}$ ,  $\mathcal{S}$  computes the tag as  $t = b^{x_i}$  and simulates the other steps using the HVZK property of the *Authentication* protocol.

For each  $\text{AUTH}_U(j, d)$  query,  $\mathcal{S}$  tests if the associated ticket  $(s, t)$  satisfies  $t = H_0(s || \text{sid}_j)^{x_\varphi}$ , where  $\text{sid}_j$  is the server ID of SP  $j$ , for all  $\varphi \in \mathcal{C}'$ . If such  $\varphi$  exists, it appends  $\varrho := (k, d)$  to row  $\varphi$  in the table  $\mathcal{T}_j$ . Otherwise, it rewinds and extracts the underlying credential  $c' := (A', e', x', y')$ . We call  $c'$  a special tuple. For each  $\text{REMOVE-FROM-BL}(j, \tau)$  query,  $\mathcal{S}$  removes the corresponding element from the table  $\mathcal{T}_j$ .

**Reduction** If a special tuple  $c'$  exists,  $\mathcal{S}$  solves the  $q$ -SDH problem as follows.

—Case I:  $e' \neq e_\varphi$  for all  $\varphi \in \mathcal{C}'$ .

Denote  $z = x' + \mu y'$ . We have:

$$\begin{aligned} A'^{e'+\gamma} &= g_0 g_1^z = g_0^{\frac{\nu_1 z (e_* + \gamma) - z}{\nu_2}} \\ A' &= g_0^{\frac{\nu_2 - z}{\nu_2 (e' + \gamma)}} \left( g_0^{\frac{\nu_1 z}{\nu_2}} \right)^{\left( 1 - \frac{e' - e_*}{e' + \gamma} \right)} \\ g_0^{\frac{1}{e' + \gamma}} &= \left( A' g_0^{\frac{-\nu_1 z}{\nu_2}} \right)^{\frac{\nu_2}{\nu_2 - z - \nu_1 z (e' - e_*)}}. \end{aligned}$$

Denote  $B' = g_0^{\frac{1}{e' + \gamma}} = g_0^{\frac{f(\gamma)}{e' + \gamma}}$ . Using long division, there exists a degree  $(q-2)$  polynomial  $f_q$  such that  $\frac{f(\gamma)}{(e' + \gamma)} = f_q(\gamma)(e' + \gamma) + f_1$  for some  $f_1 \in \mathbb{Z}_p^* \setminus \{0\}$ .

Thus  $B' = g_0^{\frac{f_1}{e' + \gamma} + f_q(\gamma)}$ . Finally,  $\mathcal{S}$  computes  $\bar{A} = \left( B' g_0^{-f_q(\gamma)} \right)^{1/f_1}$  and sets  $\bar{e} = e'$ .  $(\bar{A}, \bar{e})$  is a solution to the  $q$ -SDH problem.

—Case II:  $(e' = e_i \wedge A' = A_i)$  for some  $i \in \mathcal{I} \cup \mathcal{I}_U$ .

This case happens with negligible probability unless  $\mathcal{A}$  can solve the discrete logarithm of  $h_2$  to base  $h_1$ .

—Case III:  $e' = e_\varphi$  for some  $\varphi \in \mathcal{C}'$ .

If  $e' \neq e_*$ ,  $\mathcal{S}$  aborts. Otherwise denote  $z = x' + \mu y'$ . We have:

$$\begin{aligned} A'^{e_* + \gamma} &= g_0 g_1^z \\ A' &= g_0^{\frac{\nu_2 - z}{\nu_2(e_* + \gamma)}} g_0^{\frac{\nu_1 z}{\nu_2}} \\ g_0^{\frac{1}{e_* + \gamma}} &= \left( A' g_0^{\frac{-\nu_1 z}{\nu_2}} \right)^{\frac{\nu_2}{\nu_2 - z}}. \end{aligned}$$

Denote  $B' = g_0^{\frac{1}{e_* + \gamma}} = g_0'^{\frac{f(\gamma)}{e' + \gamma}}$ .  $\mathcal{S}$  uses the same method as in Case I to solve the  $q$ -SDH problem.

**Successful Simulation** It remains to argue that, if  $\mathcal{A}$  can win the game, a special tuple exists with non-negligible probability.

Assume there is no special tuple and  $|\mathcal{I}_U| \neq 0$ .  $\mathcal{A}$  wins the game if there exists a sequence of  $\text{AUTH}_U$  oracle query  $(\text{AUTH}_U(j, d_1), \dots, \text{AUTH}_U(j, d_m))$  such that the sequence  $(d_1, \dots, d_m)$  is not  $q$ -partitionable. We can assume  $m$  is equal to the number of  $\text{AUTH}_U(j, \cdot)$  query, for if the sequence formed by the whole series of  $\text{AUTH}_U(j, \cdot)$  query is  $q$ -partitionable, any sub-sequence of it must be  $q$ -partitionable. Let the sequence be  $Q^*$ . The set of the sequences formed by the second element of each row of table  $\mathcal{T}_j$  is a  $q$ -partition of  $Q^*$ . Denote this particular  $q$ -partition as  $Q'$ . Since  $Q^*$  is not  $q$ -partitionable, it must be the case that  $Q'$  is not bounded. It implies that there exists an  $\varphi$  and  $d$  such that the table entry  $d^*$  in the  $\varphi$ -th row and the  $d$ -th column is less than  $d$ , i.e.,  $d^* < d$ . Let the corresponding query be  $k := \text{AUTH}_U(j, d^*)$ , during which  $\mathcal{A}$  has constructed a valid proof of knowledge of SPK  $\Pi_3$  using a witness with  $x_\varphi$  in it.

Now, on the blacklist used in  $k := \text{AUTH}_U(j, d^*)$ , there are  $(d - 1)$  tickets generated using  $x_\varphi$ . (Otherwise, the adversary would have already violated the soundness of  $\Pi_3$  in at least one of the authentications associated with those  $(d - 1)$  tickets.) The soundness of  $\Pi_3$  thus implies that, with non-negligible probability,  $d < d^*$ , which contradicts to  $d^* < d$  above.

Otherwise,  $|\mathcal{I}_U| = 0$ . In that case, there must be a special tuple as  $\mathcal{C}'$  is empty. Moreover, Case I above happens with overwhelming probability since the adversary does not have any information about the  $e_i$ 's.

**7.2.2 Anonymity.** Suppose there exists a PPT adversary  $\mathcal{A}$  who can win in game *Anonymity* with non-negligible probability (say,  $\frac{1}{2} + \epsilon$ ), we show how to construct a PPT simulator  $\mathcal{S}$  that solves the DDH problem in  $\mathbb{G}$  with non-negligible probability. Given a DDH problem instance  $(g', g'^{u'}, g'^{v'}, T')$ ,  $\mathcal{S}$  is to decide if  $T' = g'^{u'v'}$ .

**Setup Phase**  $\mathcal{S}$  sets  $G = \langle g' \rangle$  and generates all other parameters honestly. The parameters and the master key of the GM are given to  $\mathcal{A}$ .

**Probing Phase 1**  $\mathcal{S}$  keeps track of every user in the system.  $\mathcal{S}$  chooses one user, denoted as user  $i^*$ . For all oracle queries (except the Hash oracle) not related to user  $i^*$ ,  $\mathcal{S}$  follows the protocol honestly.

Queries related to user  $i^*$  are handled as follows. For  $\text{REG}_G()$ ,  $\mathcal{S}$  simulates the protocol as if  $(u', y')$  is an opening of the commitment  $C$ . The distribution is perfect since for any  $u'$  there exists an  $y'$  such that  $C = g_1^{u'} g_2^{y'}$ . Upon receiving

$(A, e, y'')$  from  $\mathcal{A}$ ,  $\mathcal{S}$  records the credential for user  $i^*$  as  $(A, e, \perp, \perp)$ . The credential for user  $i^*$  is  $(A, e, u', y)$  such that  $y = y' + y''$ . This credential, however, is unknown to  $\mathcal{S}$ .

For  $\text{AUTH}(i^*, j, d)$  or  $\text{AUTH}_S(i^*, j)$  queries,  $\mathcal{S}$  chooses  $s$  and  $R$  uniformly at random and sets  $H_0(s || SP_j) = g'^R$ , where  $SP_j$  is the `sid` of SP  $j$ .  $\mathcal{S}$  then computes  $t = g'^{u'R}$  and simulates the protocols with  $\tau = (s, t)$ .

**Challenge Phase** In the challenge phase,  $\mathcal{A}$  outputs two users  $i_0^*$  and  $i_1^*$  from  $\mathcal{I}_G$ . If  $i^* \notin \{i_0^*, i_1^*\}$ ,  $\mathcal{S}$  aborts. Else,  $\mathcal{A}$  queries  $\text{AUTH}(\perp, j^*, d^*)$  if  $j^* \in \mathcal{J}$ , or  $\text{AUTH}_S(\perp, j^*, d^*)$  otherwise. Now there are two cases to consider.

In the case when  $d_0^*$  and hence  $d_1^*$  are greater than or equal to  $d^*$ ,  $\mathcal{S}$  simply returns  $\perp$  as the protocol transcript. It is straight-forward to see that the corresponding  $\text{AUTH}_S$  or  $\text{AUTH}$  query does not contain any information on  $i_0^*$  or  $i_1^*$  and probability of  $\mathcal{A}$  winning cannot be greater than  $\frac{1}{2}$ .

In the case when  $d_0^*$  and  $d_1^*$  are both less than  $d^*$ ,  $\mathcal{S}$  flips a fair coin  $\hat{b}$ . If  $i^* \neq i_{\hat{b}}^*$ ,  $\mathcal{S}$  aborts. Otherwise,  $\mathcal{S}$  chooses  $s_{i^*}$  uniformly at random and sets  $H_0(s_{i^*} || SP_j) = g'^{v'}$ .  $\mathcal{S}$  computes the ticket  $\tau = (H_0(s_{i^*} || SP_j), t_{i^*}) = (g'^{v'}, T')$  and simulates the corresponding *Authentication* protocol.

**Probing Phase 2**  $\mathcal{S}$  simulates in the same way as in Probing Phase 1 except queries to  $\text{CORRUPT-U}(i_0^*)$  or  $\text{CORRUPT-U}(i_1^*)$  are not allowed

**End Game Phase** Finally, if  $\mathcal{A}$  guessed  $\hat{b}$  correctly,  $\mathcal{S}$  answers that  $(g', g'^{u'}, g'^{v'}, T')$  is a DDH-tuple.

**Probability of Success** If  $T'$  is a DDH tuple, the simulation is perfect and  $\mathcal{A}$  wins with probability  $\frac{1}{2} + \epsilon$ . On the other hand, if  $T'$  is a random element, the simulation is imperfect in the sense that the authentication transcript is not related to either of the challenge users. In that case probability of  $\mathcal{A}$  winning cannot be greater than  $\frac{1}{2}$ .

Now with probability  $\frac{2}{|\mathcal{I}_G|}$ ,  $i^* \in \{i_0^*, i_1^*\}$ . With probability  $\frac{1}{2}$ ,  $i^* = i_{\hat{b}}^*$ . Thus, the probability of not aborting is  $\frac{1}{|\mathcal{I}_G|}$ , which is non-negligible. We assume  $\mathcal{S}$  answers “no” when it has to abort, in which case the probability of  $\mathcal{S}$  winning is  $\frac{1}{2}$ .

If  $\mathcal{S}$  does not abort and  $T'$  is a DDH tuple,  $\mathcal{A}$  wins with probability  $\frac{1}{2} + \epsilon$ . If  $T'$  is a random element,  $\mathcal{A}$  can only output the guess bit correctly with probability no more than  $\frac{1}{2}$  since the transcript of the challenge authentication does not contain any information on  $i_{\hat{b}}^*$ . In fact,  $\mathcal{A}$  could abort or behave randomly and for simplicity we let its winning probability be  $\epsilon'$  such that  $0 \leq \epsilon' \leq \frac{1}{2}$ .

To summarize, there are 4 cases.

- (1)  $T'$  is a DDH tuple,  $\mathcal{S}$  answers “yes”. The corresponding probability is  $\frac{1}{2} + \epsilon$ .
- (2)  $T'$  is a DDH tuple,  $\mathcal{S}$  answers “no”. The corresponding probability is  $\frac{1}{2} - \epsilon$ .
- (3)  $T'$  is *not* a DDH tuple,  $\mathcal{S}$  answers “yes”. The corresponding probability is  $\epsilon'$  for some  $\epsilon'$  such that  $0 \leq \epsilon' \leq \frac{1}{2}$ .
- (4)  $T'$  is *not* a DDH tuple,  $\mathcal{S}$  answers “no”. The corresponding probability is  $1 - \epsilon'$  for some  $\epsilon'$  such that  $0 \leq \epsilon' \leq \frac{1}{2}$ .

The probability that  $\mathcal{S}$  answers correctly (case 1 + case 4) is therefore

$$\frac{1}{2}(\frac{1}{2} + \epsilon + 1 - \epsilon') = \frac{1}{2} + \frac{\epsilon}{2} + (\frac{1}{2} - \epsilon'),$$

which is no less than  $\frac{1}{2} + \frac{\epsilon}{2}$ . Summing up the cases of aborting and not aborting, the probability of  $\mathcal{S}$  winning is at least  $\frac{1}{2} + \frac{\epsilon}{2|\mathcal{I}_G|}$ .

**7.2.3 Non-Frameability.** Suppose there exists a PPT adversary  $\mathcal{A}$  who can win in game *Non-Frameability* with non-negligible probability, we show how to construct a PPT simulator  $\mathcal{S}$  that solves the discrete logarithm problem in  $\mathbb{G}$ .

On input of a DL problem instance  $(T', g')$ ,  $\mathcal{S}$  is required to compute  $u'$  such that  $g'^{u'} = T'$ .

Setup Phase  $\mathcal{S}$  sets  $\mathbb{G} = \langle g' \rangle$  and all other parameters are generated honestly. The parameters and the master key of the GM are given to  $\mathcal{A}$ .

Probing Phase  $\mathcal{S}$  keeps track of every user present in the system.  $\mathcal{S}$  chooses one user, denoted as user  $\hat{i}$ . For all oracle queries (except Hash oracle) not related to user  $\hat{i}$ ,  $\mathcal{S}$  follows the protocol honestly. Let  $\mathcal{C}$  be the set of credentials  $\mathcal{S}$  has obtained from  $\mathcal{A}$  in the  $\text{REG}_G()$  query.

Queries related to user  $\hat{i}$  are handled as follows. For  $\text{REG}_G()$ ,  $\mathcal{S}$  simulates the protocol as if  $u', y'$  is an opening of the commitment  $C$ . The distribution is perfect since for any  $u'$  there exists a  $y'$  such that  $C = g_1^{u'} g_2^{y'}$ . Upon receiving  $(A, e, y'')$  from  $\mathcal{A}$ ,  $\mathcal{S}$  adds  $(A, e, \perp, \perp)$  to  $\mathcal{C}$ . Note that the credential for user  $\hat{i}$  is  $(A, e, u', y)$  such that  $y = y' + y''$  and is unknown to  $\mathcal{S}$ .

For  $\text{AUTH}(\hat{i}, j, d)$  or  $\text{AUTH}_S(\hat{i}, j)$ ,  $\mathcal{S}$  chooses  $s$  and  $R$  uniformly at random and sets  $H_0(s || SP_j) = g'^R$ , where  $SP_j$  is the `sid` of SP  $j$ .  $\mathcal{S}$  then computes  $t = g'^{u'R}$  and simulates the protocols with  $\tau = (s, t)$ .

End Game Phase Finally,  $\mathcal{S}$  aborts if  $\hat{i} \neq i^*$ . With probability  $\frac{1}{|\mathcal{I}_G|}$ ,  $\mathcal{S}$  does not abort. Since  $d^* > d_i^*$  (refer to Section 4.3.3 for their meaning), the fact that the challenge AUTH query terminated unsuccessfully implies that with overwhelming probability there exists an  $\text{ADD-TO-BL}(j^*, k')$  query for some  $k'$  such that  $k'$  is the output of an  $\text{AUTH}_U$  query. (Observe that  $k'$  cannot be an output of  $\text{AUTH}(i^*, \cdot, \cdot)$  or  $\text{AUTH}_S(i^*, \cdot, \cdot)$ .) Denote by  $\varpi_{k'}$  the transcript of the  $\text{AUTH}_U$  query. Assume  $(s', t') = \text{Extract}(\varpi_{k'})$ ,  $\mathcal{S}$  rewinds the SPK in the  $\text{AUTH}_U$  query and obtains  $u' = \log_{H_0(s' || \cdot)}(t')$ . It returns  $u'$  as the solution of the DL problem. Informally speaking, the above means that, to prevent an honest user from authenticating himself successfully, the adversary must have conducted some kind of  $k' := \text{AUTH}_U$  query such that the associate ticket is equal to  $H_0(\cdot || \cdot)^x$  so that  $x$  is the secret of the target user  $i^*$ . Then the adversary queries  $\text{ADD-TO-BL}(j^*, k')$ , making the corresponding AUTH to terminate unsuccessfully.  $\mathcal{S}$ , by rewinding the  $\text{AUTH}_U$  query  $k'$ , thus gets to know the DL of  $u'$ , which is  $x$ .

## 8. PERFORMANCE EVALUATION

We now present results from the experimental evaluation of our BLAC construction.

### 8.1 Prototype Implementation

We implemented our construction of BLAC in C and packaged the code into a software library to allow for easy adoption by application developers. We have not implemented the extension for supporting a  $d$ -strikes-out revocation policy and our current implementation therefore supports only a 1-strike-out revocation policy.

We used the PBC Library<sup>12</sup> (version 0.4.11) for the underlying elliptic-curve and pairing operations, which is built on the GMP Library.<sup>13</sup> We also made use of several routines in OpenSSL,<sup>14</sup> such as its SHA-1 hash function for instantiating the cryptographic hash functions needed by our construction.

We used pairings over Type-A curves as defined in the PBC library. A curve of this type has the form of  $E : y^2 = x^3 + x$  over the field  $\mathbb{F}_q$  for some prime  $q$ . Both  $\mathbb{G}_1$  and  $\mathbb{G}_2$  are the group of points  $E(\mathbb{F}_q)$  of order  $p$  for some prime  $p$  such that  $p$  is a factor of  $q + 1$ . The pairing is symmetric and has an embedding degree  $k$  of 2. Thus  $\mathbb{G}$  is a subgroup of  $\mathbb{F}_{q^2}$ . In our implementation,  $q$  and  $p$  are respectively 512-bit and 160-bit integers. We used  $\mathbb{G}$  for the group wherein the tickets reside.

The interface to the library we implemented is defined by a list of C functions. Some of the more important functions are as follows. `setup()` is a function that implements the *Setup* algorithm. The functions `register_gm()` and `register_user()`, executed by the GM and the user respectively, together implement the *Registration* protocol. Similarly `authen_sp()` and `authen_user()` together implement the *Authentication* protocol.

To test and evaluate our library implementation, we wrote a driver application that allows users to post text messages at a web forum. This can be thought of as users editing Wikipedia pages. We did not prototype the user registration part of the system because our major interest was to study the performance of the *Authentication* protocol.

In the application, authentication is carried out as follows. The SP first creates a listening socket. Upon the arrival of a connection request from a user, the SP sets up an SSL socket with the user using OpenSSL.<sup>15</sup> This means that a confidential and server-authenticated channel is set up between the user and the SP. From within this channel, the user and the server respectively execute `authen_user()` and `authen_sp()`. If `authen_sp` returns `failure`, the SP closes the SSL connection, thereby refusing to serve the user. Otherwise, SP serves the user using the same channel by recording the text message sent by the user, along with the ticket extracted from the authentication transcript. The SP may then manually inspect the text message and add the associated ticket to its blacklist.

Alternatively, by integrating BLAC authentication into SSL server-authentication, one can realize a kind of mutual authentication, in which the user authenticates the server's identity while the server is assured that (and only that) the user is some well-behaving user.

## 8.2 Experimental Results and Analysis

For our experiments, we used a Dell OptiPlex 745 desktop machine with an Intel dual-core (Core 2) 1.86GHz CPU and 1GB of RAM, running Linux/Ubuntu 7.10. All the timings reported below were averaged over 10 randomized runs.

We measured two time quantities related to the execution of the *Authentication* protocol: (1) the time it took for an SP to verify the authentication (i.e., step 4

<sup>12</sup><http://crypto.stanford.edu/pbc/>

<sup>13</sup><http://gmplib.org/>

<sup>14</sup><http://www.openssl.org/>

<sup>15</sup>For the sake of simplicity, the SP uses a self-signed key-pair to authenticate itself.



of the protocol), and (2) the time it took for a user to inspect the blacklist and produce a proof (i.e., steps 2 and 3 of the protocol), with preprocessing enabled. The sum of these two quantities roughly represents the total latency incurred by the protocol as perceived by the user.

When the blacklist was empty, it took the SP 0.06s to verify the authentication. When the blacklist had 400 entries instead, it took the SP 0.46s to do the same. On the other hand, when the blacklist size was 0 and 400, the user spent 0.09ms and 0.73s respectively to inspect the blacklist and produce a proof. The estimated protocol latencies are thus 0.06s and 1.19s respectively. The total communication overhead due to the authentication protocol is roughly 0.27KB per blacklist entry. Figures 1(a) and 1(b) show experimental data collected with different blacklist sizes. In Section 9, we elaborate on the feasibility of our construction in real applications.

Note that our authentication protocol scales well with the number of cores in CPUs because virtually all computation that grows linearly with the blacklist size is parallelizable.<sup>16</sup> As evidence, on our dual-core machine, all the timings we collected using a single-threaded implementation almost doubled the figures of our current multi-threaded implementation, whose figures are reported above.

## 9. DISCUSSION

We discuss several issues related to the deployment of BLAC in a real-world setting.

### 9.1 Efficiency


In our cryptographic construction, blacklist verification requires  $O(n)$  computations, where  $n$  is the number of entries in the blacklist. As indicated by Section 8, our scheme would support 1,600 blacklist entries with 2 authentications per second on an 8-core machine.<sup>17</sup> Since anonymous authentication will be used at SPs such as Wikipedia only for certain operations such as editing webpages, we believe this performance is reasonable. Consider two extreme examples. In March 2007, Wikipedia averaged about two edits per second to its set of English webpages.<sup>18</sup> Likewise, YouTube reported less than one video upload per second on average in July 2006.<sup>19</sup> The communication complexity required to sustain one or two authentications per second with 1,600 blacklist entries would be about 3.5 to 7 Mbps for the SP. Such a data rate would be high for an individual server, but would be reasonable for large SPs such as YouTube and Wikipedia, which may have distributed servers across the nation for handling large bandwidth. Based on these calculations, SPs with much lower authentication rates than Wikipedia or YouTube (e.g., one authentication every few seconds) can easily be served on commodity hardware and T-1 lines. We reiterate that our construction is the first to allow anonymous blacklisting without TTPs, and more efficient blacklist checking, perhaps in  $O(\log n)$  or  $O(1)$  time, is an open problem that deserves further research. Faster verification will allow much higher rates of authentication while

<sup>16</sup>The only exception is the two calls to SHA-1, but they take comparably negligible time.


<sup>17</sup>An 8-core Mac Pro with two 2.26GHz Quad-Core Intel Xeon processors was available for approximately \$3,000 at the time of writing.

<sup>18</sup><http://stats.wikimedia.org/EN/PlotsPngDatabaseEdits.htm>

<sup>19</sup><http://technology.guardian.co.uk/weekly/story/0,,1823959,00.html>



(a) Generating proofs at the user takes approximately twice the amount of time taken by the SP. With precomputation, this time is cut in half. Authentication latencies are on the order of a couple of seconds for 1,000 blacklist entries. The timings we collected were consistent, and the error bars representing one standard deviation around the mean are barely visible in this graph.



(b) Communication is on the order of 300–400 KB for 1,000 blacklist entries and is approximately the same for uplink and downlink communication.

Fig. 1. The communication and execution times scale linearly with the size of the blacklist.

supporting extremely large blacklists, and this problem is, therefore, worthy of further study. As mentioned earlier, our follow-up work on PEREA [Tsang et al. 2008] alters the semantics of revocation to provide more efficient authentication. PEREA introduces the concept of a *revocation window*, the number of subsequent authentications before which a misbehavior must be recognized and blacklisted for the user to be revoked. These semantics allow for more efficient authentication at the server, but allows for the possibility of blacklisted users to remain unrevoked (if misbehaviors are not recognized within the revocation window).

## 9.2 Interleaving Authentications

An individual user may attempt to interleave multiple authentications and take up several hundreds of entries in the blacklist by misbehaving several times in a short span of time. Such an attack is possible because users can parallelize several anonymous sessions with an SP. A promising approach would be to use a scheme such as Camenisch et al.’s [2006] periodic  $n$ -times anonymous authentication to rate-limit the number of anonymous accesses from users. In such a scheme, an anonymous user would be able to access the SP anonymously at most  $n$  times within a time period. For example, for  $n = 10$  and a time period of 1 day, a single user would be able to contribute at most 10 entries to the blacklist in a given day. Alternatively, Syverson et al.’s [1997] scheme mentioned in Section 1 could be used to force serialized connections from anonymous users, but nevertheless users may connect several times (serially) within a short span of time. Thus rate limiting of some kind would be necessary.

*Remark.* Since concurrent sessions are preempted while an entry is added (atomically) to a blacklist, our system guarantees that once an entry is added to the blacklist at time  $t$ , the blacklisted user will not be able to access the service after time  $t$  (or until unblacklisted at a later time).

## 9.3 Enrollment Issues

We assume that the Group Manager issues only one credential per legitimate user and assume it is difficult to perform “Sybil” attacks [Douceur 2002], where users are able to obtain multiple credentials by posing as different identities. The Sybil attack, however, is a challenging problem that any credential system is vulnerable to, and we do not attempt to solve this problem here.

In reality, users may eventually misplace their credentials, or have them compromised. Since that credential may be blacklisted by an SP, issuing a new credential to a user can help that user circumvent blacklisting. As a trade-off, we suggest that if a user misplaces his or her credential, that user is issued a pseudonymous credential for a certain amount of time called the “linkability window” before a new anonymous credential is issued. If a user repeatedly attempts to acquire new credentials, the linkability window of that user can be increased to curb misbehavior.

## 9.4 Allowing the Sharing of (Entries in) Blacklists

We have presented BLAC in which an SP cannot use an entry from another SP’s blacklist (corresponding to Alice) to prevent Alice from successfully authenticating to the SP. Nevertheless, in some applications, a group of SPs may desire to block users misbehaving at any one of the SPs.

BLAC can be modified to allow such sharing: instead of computing the tag in a ticket as  $t = H(s||\text{sid})^x$ , a user computes it as  $t = H(s)^x$  regardless of the SP the user is connecting to. Tickets computed as such can be shared among SPs as adding a user’s ticket borrowed from another SP is no different from the SP obtaining a ticket directly from the same user. Such a modified construction, however, has different privacy implications. For instance, Wikipedia may decide to add only YouTube’s tickets to its blacklist. If a user’s authentication fails, Wikipedia knows

that the user has previously visited YouTube. Even though the user is anonymous, an SP can learn some information about the user’s behavior at another SP.

### 9.5 Revoking Compromised TPMs

Concurrent to our work, Brickell and Li [2007] have proposed a method to unlinkably revoke compromised Trusted Platform Modules (TPMs) [TPM Work Group 2006]. While targeting a different application, their solution is similar to ours. Nevertheless, signatures in their solution are not bound to the verifier’s identity and authenticating even once could result in the global revocation of the prover; our solution provides more privacy by allowing the non-sharing of blacklist entries among verifiers as an option. Also, their solution does not support a  $d$ -strikes-out revocation policy. We note, however, their solution is RSA-based while ours is pairing-based, thus providing an alternative based on different hardness assumptions.

## 10. CONCLUSIONS

We present BLAC, a credential system for anonymous authentication that for the first time simultaneously provides *privacy-enhanced revocation*, *subjective judging*, and *eliminates the reliance on trusted third parties* capable of revoking the privacy of users. We believe the ability to revoke users while maintaining their anonymity is a worthwhile endeavor. While BLAC demonstrates the feasibility of such a goal, we encourage researchers to develop solutions that are more efficient—BLAC requires computation at the SP that is linear in the size of the blacklist. We make one such attempt with PEREA [Tsang et al. 2008], albeit with different revocation semantics. We also believe our contributions of supporting a  $d$ -strikes-out revocation policy is a novel analog to threshold-based approaches such as  $k$ -TAA. Future work could explore more complex policies such as boolean combinations of misbehaviors (such as “user has defaced a webpage AND user has posted copyrighted material more than 3 times”).

## 11. ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

This work was supported in part by the Institute for Security Technology Studies, under Grant number 2005-DD-BX-1091 awarded by the Bureau of Justice Assistance, and the National Science Foundation, under grant CNS-0524695. The views and conclusions do not necessarily represent those of the sponsors.

The authors would like to thank Jiangtao Li and the anonymous CCS’07 reviewers for their valuable comments.

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